Endogenous Intra-household Balance of Power and its Impact on Expenditure Patterns: Evidence from India
Article first published online: 21 MAR 2006
Volume 73, Issue 291, pages 435–460, August 2006
How to Cite
LANCASTER, G., MAITRA, P. and RAY, R. (2006), Endogenous Intra-household Balance of Power and its Impact on Expenditure Patterns: Evidence from India. Economica, 73: 435–460. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00502.x
- Issue published online: 21 MAR 2006
- Article first published online: 21 MAR 2006
- Final version received 12 April 2005.
This paper extends the collective approach to household behaviour by proposing and estimating a model in which the weights attached to individual members are endogenously determined. The estimation is conducted using two different data-sets from three Indian states. We find that relative bargaining power of the adult decision-makers has a statistically significant effect on the budget share of an item and that the effects are typically nonlinear and vary significantly across items. This implies that household welfare is better protected in households where bargaining power is spread evenly between the spouses than where one partner enjoys a dominant position.