I would like to thank David Baron, Jonathan Bendor and Timothy Feddersen for insightful comments.
A SIGNALING MODEL OF COMPETITIVE POLITICAL PRESSURES
Version of Record online: 27 OCT 2006
Economics & Politics
Volume 7, Issue 3, pages 181–206, November 1995
How to Cite
Lohmann, S. (1995), A SIGNALING MODEL OF COMPETITIVE POLITICAL PRESSURES. Economics & Politics, 7: 181–206. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00110.x
- Issue online: 27 OCT 2006
- Version of Record online: 27 OCT 2006
This paper models competitive political pressures as a signaling phenomenon. People participate in collective action in support of or against the status quo, or they abstain. Their actions and abstentions inform the decision of a policymaker who may overturn the status quo in favor of a policy alternative. By providing an informational microfoundation for the widely used reduced-form “pressure production functions” and “political influence functions,” the analysis allows me to reexamine the role of the free rider problem in creating a bias towards vocal special interests.
The signaling hypothesis finds empirical support with a study of pro- and anti-Gulf War demonstrations that took place in San Francisco and Kansas City (Missouri) in early 1991.