POLITICS WITH AND WITHOUT POLICY

Authors


  • Revised June 3, 1996. We are grateful for comments by the editor, two anonymous referees, members of the Public Choice Study Group at UC-Irvine, Alberto Alesina, John Londregan, Susanne Lohmann, Donald Wittman, and seminar participants at the UC Political Economy Workshop (UC-Santa Cruz, June 1995), Brown University and the University of California-Riverside.

‡Corresponding author: Amihai Glazer, Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697.

Abstract

When strategic complementarities lead to the existence of multiple equilibria, a change in control of government may lead to changes in economic behavior by consumers or firms even if the different parties pursue the same policies. The existence of multiple equilibria, however, is not necessary to predict partisan effects. Furthermore, electoral uncertainty is not necessary to generate partisan effects; indeed, such uncertainty can dampen the cycle.

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