We would like to thank Jorge Martínez Pagés, an anonymous referee and seminar participants at the Banco de España for helpful comments and suggestions, and Francisco Alonso, Francisco de Castro, María Oleaga and Isabel Paúl for research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily correspond to those of the Bank of Spain.
Shareholder Value Creation in European M&As
Version of Record online: 20 FEB 2004
European Financial Management
Volume 10, Issue 1, pages 47–81, March 2004
How to Cite
Campa, J. M. and Hernando, I. (2004), Shareholder Value Creation in European M&As. European Financial Management, 10: 47–81. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2004.00240.x
- Issue online: 20 FEB 2004
- Version of Record online: 20 FEB 2004
- mergers and acquisitions;
- event study
This paper looks at the value generated to shareholders by the announcement of mergers and acquisitions involving firms in the European Union over the period 1998–2000. Cumulative abnormal shareholder returns due to the announcement of a merger reflect a revision of the expected value resulting from future synergies or wealth redistribution among stakeholders. Target firm shareholders receive on average a statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of 9% in a one-month window centred on the announcement date. Acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns are null on average. When distinguishing in terms of the geographical and sectoral dimensions of the merger deals, our main finding is that mergers in industries that had previously been under government control or that are still heavily regulated generate lower value than M&A announcements in unregulated industries. This low value creation in regulated industries becomes significantly negative when the merger involves two firms from different countries and is primarily due to the lower positive return that shareholders of the target firm enjoy upon the announcement of the merger. This evidence is consistent with the existence of obstacles (such as cultural, legal, or transaction barriers) to the successful conclusion of this type of transaction, which lessen the probability of the merger actually being completed as announced and, therefore, reduce its expected value.