We thank an anonymous referee, Ingolf Dittmann and Ernst Maug for valued input.
Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories
Article first published online: 5 MAY 2009
© 2009 The Authors Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
European Financial Management
Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 486–496, June 2009
How to Cite
Edmans, A. and Gabaix, X. (2009), Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories. European Financial Management, 15: 486–496. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2009.00500.x
- Issue published online: 26 MAY 2009
- Article first published online: 5 MAY 2009
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