For valuable comments and suggestions, we thank the editor, John Doukas, and an anonymous referee. Part of this research was written while the first author served as a Visiting Associate Professor at Thammasat University, Mahidol University, Chiang Mai University and The National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) in Thailand.
How Do Powerful CEOs Affect Analyst Coverage?
Version of Record online: 3 JUL 2012
© 2012 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
European Financial Management
Volume 20, Issue 3, pages 652–676, June 2014
How to Cite
Jiraporn, P., Liu, Y. and Kim, Y. S. (2014), How Do Powerful CEOs Affect Analyst Coverage?. European Financial Management, 20: 652–676. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2012.00655.x
- Issue online: 17 JUN 2014
- Version of Record online: 3 JUL 2012
- analyst coverage;
- analyst following;
- CEO power;
- agency theory;
- agency costs
We examine how CEO power affects the extent of analyst coverage. CEO power can influence a CEO's incentives to disclose information. The amount of information disclosed by the CEO in turn influences the information environment, which affects financial analysts’ incentives to follow the firm. Consistent with this notion, we show that firms with powerful CEOs are covered by fewer analysts. In addition, the evidence shows that firms with more powerful CEOs experience less information asymmetry. Powerful CEOs are well insulated and have fewer incentives to conceal information, resulting in more transparency. The information provided to investors directly by the firm substitutes for the information in the analyst's report. As a result, the demand for analyst coverage is lower. Our results are important because they show that CEO power affects important corporate outcomes such as corporate transparency and analyst following.