Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism
Version of Record online: 9 MAR 2010
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
European Journal of Philosophy
Volume 19, Issue 4, pages 607–624, December 2011
How to Cite
Whiting, D. (2011), Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism. European Journal of Philosophy, 19: 607–624. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00403.x
- Issue online: 9 MAR 2010
- Version of Record online: 9 MAR 2010
Abstract: According to deflationism, grasp of the concept of truth consists in nothing more than a disposition to accept a priori (non-paradoxical) instances of the schema:
(DS) It is true that p if and only if p.
According to contextualism, the same expression with the same meaning might, on different occasions of use, express different propositions bearing different truth-conditions (where this does not result from indexicality and the like). On this view, what is expressed in an utterance depends in a non-negligible way on the circumstances. Charles Travis claims that contextualism shows that ‘deflationism is a mistake’, that truth is a more substantive notion than deflationism allows. In this paper, I examine Travis's arguments in support of this ‘inflationary’ claim and argue that they are unsuccessful.