G. E. Moore and Bad Faith
Article first published online: 15 JUN 2010
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
European Journal of Philosophy
Volume 20, Issue 3, pages 347–365, September 2012
How to Cite
Coleman, A. (2012), G. E. Moore and Bad Faith. European Journal of Philosophy, 20: 347–365. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00413.x
- Issue published online: 26 AUG 2012
- Article first published online: 15 JUN 2010
Abstract: G. E. Moore claimed to know a variety of commonsense propositions. He is often accused of being dogmatic or of begging the question against philosophers who deny that he knows such things. In this paper, I argue that this accusation is mistaken. I argue that Moore is instead guilty of answering questions of the form ‘Do I know p?’ in bad faith.