Could a Brain in a Vat Self-Refer?
Version of Record online: 5 OCT 2010
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
European Journal of Philosophy
Volume 21, Issue 1, pages 74–93, March 2013
How to Cite
Madden, R. (2013), Could a Brain in a Vat Self-Refer?. European Journal of Philosophy, 21: 74–93. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00435.x
- Issue online: 18 MAR 2013
- Version of Record online: 5 OCT 2010
Abstract: Radical sceptical possibilities challenge the anti-realist view that truth consists in ideal rational acceptability. Putnam, as part of his defence of an anti-realist view, subjected the case of the brain in a vat to a semantic externalist treatment, which aimed to maintain the desired connection between truth and ideal rational acceptability. It is argued here that self-consciousness poses special problems for this externalist strategy. It is shown how, on a standard model of first-person reference, Putnam's brain in a vat will be mistaken in its rational self-ascription of externalist predicates. The natural response, which employs an alternative model of first-person reference, is shown to have the equally realist consequence that there are enquiry-transcendent truths about the self.