The Solution to the Consequence Problem According to Anti-Individualism
Article first published online: 8 JUN 2011
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
European Journal of Philosophy
How to Cite
Barel, F. (2011), The Solution to the Consequence Problem According to Anti-Individualism. European Journal of Philosophy. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00468.x
- Article first published online: 8 JUN 2011
Abstract: For quite some time now there has been an ongoing debate whether authoritative self-knowledge is compatible with anti-individualism.1 One influential line of argument against compatibilism is due to Paul Boghossian (1998). I argue that Boghossian misconstrues what the anti-individualist really is committed to. This defence of compatibilism is elaborated by showing how the Twin Earth thought experiment is meant to speak in favour of anti-individualism. Partly this will show that Boghossian is wrong in his denial that empirical background knowledge is imported into the Twin Earth experiment. The main points argued are that Boghossian fails to realize, both, (1) that anti-individualism does not involve concept-individuation in terms of reference, and (2) that anti-individualism assumes a core of representational success. In effect, these two points constitute an entirely new way to defend compatibilism, a way that seems to have gone unnoticed in the literature.