Kant on the Content of Cognition
Article first published online: 22 NOV 2011
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
European Journal of Philosophy
How to Cite
Tolley, C. (2011), Kant on the Content of Cognition. European Journal of Philosophy. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00483.x
- Article first published online: 22 NOV 2011
I present an argument for an interpretation of Kant's views on the nature of the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations of Kant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes to Kant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading of Kant put forward by McDowell and others, according to which Kant embraces a version of Russellianism, I argue that Kant's views on this topic are of a much more Fregean bent than has traditionally been admitted or appreciated. I conclude by providing a sketch of how a better grasp of Kant's views on cognitive content in general can help bring into sharper relief what is, and what is not, at stake in the recent debates over whether Kant accepts a particular kind of cognitive content—namely, non-conceptual content.