Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth
Article first published online: 21 DEC 2011
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
European Journal of Philosophy
How to Cite
Kallestrup, J. and Pritchard, D. (2011), Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth. European Journal of Philosophy. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00495.x
- Article first published online: 21 DEC 2011
A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue-theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate the need for virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge to appeal to an independent epistemic condition which excludes knowledge-undermining epistemic luck.