Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single, Objective World
Article first published online: 17 APR 2012
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
European Journal of Philosophy
How to Cite
McManus, D. (2012), Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single, Objective World. European Journal of Philosophy. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00529.x
- Article first published online: 17 APR 2012
Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger literature suggests (focusing, in particular, on work by John Haugeland), and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands (an exploration informed by the work of Bernard Williams and Adrian Moore), I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of Being’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject-matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ might be like.