*Professor of Political Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. I wish to acknowledge the insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper from Wojciech Sadurski, Paul Rishworth, Jim Allan and the anonymous reviewers for the Modern Law Review. I would also like to acknowledge the helpful responses to presentations of this paper at the Research Seminar in Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, European University Institute, Florence, in January 2005 and in Australia at the Research School of Social Science at ANU, and faculty law seminars at UNSW and Monash University, in March and April 2005.
Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?
Article first published online: 9 JAN 2006
The Modern Law Review
Volume 69, Issue 1, pages 7–28, January 2006
How to Cite
Hiebert, J. L. (2006), Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?. The Modern Law Review, 69: 7–28. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.2006.00574.x
- Issue published online: 9 JAN 2006
- Article first published online: 9 JAN 2006
- parliamentary rights model;
- political rights review;
- judicial review
This paper examines the emergence of a new model for protecting rights (referred to as the ‘parliamentary rights’ model) in Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Australian Capital Territory. This parliamentary model is distinguished from the more traditional, judicial-centric, approach to rights protection in at least two ways. The first is that this parliamentary rights model incorporates the notion of legitimate political dissent from judicial interpretations of rights. The second way it challenges the court-centred model is by incorporating the systematic evaluation of proposed legislation from a rights perspective. Both of these features allow for the possibility of a broader range of perspectives on the appropriate interpretation of rights or the resolution of disagreements involving claims of rights than those arising from more judicial-centric bills of rights. The paper assesses whether this alternative approach to rights protection satisfies those sceptics who doubt the virtue or prudence of conceiving of political disputes as legal rights claims for which the judiciary has the dominant role in their interpretation and resolution.