Heidegger's deconstruction of the history of Western metaphysics has been a major influence behind poststructural critiques of modernity as well as more apologetic attempts to maintain a dialogue with historical sources, such as Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. This bifurcation has intensified the ambiguity of Heidegger's project: was it an attempt to relinquish philosophical ties to the past or a call for a fundamental reinterpretation of them? In this article I argue the latter, focusing my analysis on Heidegger's notions of appropriation and historicity. On the one hand, appropriation is the hermeneutical event by which ontology is reinfused into a reading of historical sources. On the other hand, historicity is the self-reflexive historical involvement by which we become aware of what contemporary, philosophical conditions necessitate this reengagement. In the end, Heidegger's critique of metaphysics arises from this self-reflexivity. It deconstructs the prevailing misunderstandings of philosophical sources in order to allow for reinterpretation at a revivified ontological level constantly in view of the question of being.

The general assumption made of Heidegger's thinking on metaphysics is that his intention was to overcome and dispense with metaphysics due to its distortion of the question of being. This has influenced recent scholarship in two general directions, directly relating to the twofold structure of Heidegger's hermeneutics: deconstruction and reconstruction.1 Postmodern and poststructural thinking tends to follow the former while the more apologetic philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur follow the latter.2 But in highlighting this division, I am concerned with an unavoidable obstacle that forces us to some degree to think about placing Heidegger's own critique of metaphysics in the reconstructive phase of his hermeneutics. I refer to the fact that if we accept Heidegger's claim that the history of philosophy as metaphysics has determined ontology according to beings alone then this reading of history becomes unilateral, relegating the history of philosophy to the ‘ontic dustbin’.3 The difficulty is that not only do Plato and Aristotle become the ‘straw men’ for contemporary philosophy, but Heidegger's own hermeneutic collapses upon itself since his notion of repetition and retrieval [Wiederholung] as the foundation of historicity is nullified. While some commentators note that Heidegger is not simply speaking of a one-sided overcoming but of some reconfiguration of metaphysics, they have done this without carrying out the deeper implications of Heidegger's own understanding of how philosophy (as ontology and phenomenology) is to engage the tradition that precedes it and subsequently confronts it.4 John Caputo, for example, states that the retrieval side of Heidegger's hermeneutics is often ignored (i.e., by Richard Rorty); however, Caputo only offers a further characterization of retrieval as ontological openness to being without indicating how the tradition itself may be retrieved in view of the postmodern suspicion that tends to repudiate traditional thinking.5 While this is a massive project, my intention is to provide some suggestions as to how this retrieval may be initiated.

I choose to see Heidegger's critique as anticipating the appropriation of metaphysics where his description of turning supercedes overcoming. Turning is what constitutes Ereignis, the event of being coming into its own, or what Heidegger also refers to as ‘appropriation’.6 Appropriation designates the moment in which the presencing of being is not taken up according to any specific determination but is allowed to presence as itself.7 Consequently, the force of my argument is that the appropriation of metaphysics is a manner of thinking that allows the essence of metaphysics to presence as itself. Furthermore, because metaphysics is encountered as a discourse that arrives through history, the presencing of the essence of metaphysics is one that must come through, and not dispense with or marginalize, the tradition itself. This is how I interpret Heidegger's statement that the turn as appropriation is ‘the turning of the oblivion of Being into the safekeeping belonging to the coming to presence of Being’.8 The turn involved in appropriation is therefore nothing that can be methodologically secured; it requires a conscious reflection on the foundation of its enterprise. The turn marks a hermeneutical inception that requires constant reengagement and reinitiation; and thus it is by virtue of the turn that the tradition can be rethought according to new ontological possibilities provoked by contemporary historical necessities or crises.9 In this way, interpretation that involves itself in the history of philosophy is not a regress from some original state but a manner of making history meaningful, that is, a making present of meaning in and through history.

What therefore constitutes the heart of my argument is Heidegger's understanding of historicity as retrieval and repetition where, in the words of Being and Time, ‘Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself’.10 Meaning as a historical phenomenon is only maintained when it is constantly reengaged, and this includes the very tradition of metaphysics that has been ‘destined’ since Plato. I argue that this reengagement is precipitated by removing metaphysics from an over-determined spatial orientation (subsequent to the determination of being as beings) and situating it back within Heidegger's notion of original temporality. In this way, as Robert Bernasconi notes: ‘Repetition is never a simple reiteration of the past; it includes reconstructing the tradition to which each of us is said to belong’.11 I believe this interpretation of Heidegger's approach maintains the flowing and unfixed exigency of hermeneutics that is necessitated by the openness of being-in-history. This is where philosophical questioning is opened infinitely through its finite means, that is, its openness through its specific location in a historical narrative. Thus in relation to the appropriation of metaphysics, an understanding of historicity is the means by which metaphysics itself can initiate this transformation. History, on this view, constitutes both a limit and an opening, or what Heidegger himself understood phenomenologically as the Greek peras: ‘A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing’.12

This paper's argument shall proceed in three parts: I) a recapitulation of Heidegger's critique; II) a clarification of this critique; and III) the appropriation, or retrieval, of metaphysics. Because my analysis does not focus on any one moment of Heidegger's intellectual career, one of my key presuppositions concerns the unity of his works and how his later thought is in fact constituted by a turn that is not antithetical to his earlier writings.13 It is my view that there is a demand of Heidegger's interpreters to see how the earlier Heidegger is ‘contained’ by the later.14 With regard to the question of metaphysics, the unity of Heidegger's writing becomes a matter of understanding the force of his critique in order to see how it is ultimately appropriated. In other words, because the projects of deconstruction and reconstruction ultimately imply one another there is no clear historical distinction, and I believe a historiographical enterprise of delineating texts according to such a demarcation is the subject of another kind of study. In general, I see that there was a reflective momentum in Heidegger's thinking whose inertia could not be overcome until he adequately deconstructed the tradition. Arriving ‘after’ Heidegger, as it were, contemporary commentators may take it for granted how challenging his critique was and had to be in order to clear the ground for a new direction. The force of his critique can therefore appear to be axiomatic rather than ‘instrumental’ or necessary for the times.


The core of Heidegger's argument against metaphysics is inseparable from his lifelong project of recovering and reflecting upon the question of the meaning of being.15 What metaphysics resorts to is the causal reduction of being itself to a being. Thus, Plato's ‘Good beyond Being’ and the ‘unmoved mover’ of Aristotle's metaphysics mark the inception and decisive turn away from the truth of being in being to its dislocation somewhere else:

From Plato on philosophers have sensed that something beyond ordinary beings was responsible for their existence and their intelligibility, but since the clearing [Lichtung] always stays in the background … philosophers have replaced it with a highest being that is the ground of beings and the source of all meaning.16

Indeed for metaphysics ‘all multiplicity must be reducible to a single principle’.17 On Heidegger's view, metaphysical principles and ideas are in fact beings ‘set to philosophical work’ that in turn stand before ‘the clearing’ and therefore conceal being itself.18

While this critique offers much fuel for the postmodern and poststructuralist challenges to traditional metanarratives, I would like to mark the specific temporal determination that arises within an interpretation of metaphysics. I refer namely to the point that with the reduction of being itself to a metaphysical preoccupation with beings, the resulting tendency is to spatialize all ontological relations according to this ontic determination. Indeed, this occurs to the point where temporality, too, is subordinated to spatial conception.19 When beings stand forth in such a way, the manner of their presencing, or the being-true of beings [on hos alethes],20 is concealed. Wherever metaphysics assumes this philosophical posture of placing a being (or even beings) before the question of being, a temporal and spatial distortion occurs. Indeed, in Heidegger's later works this takes the form of the deceptive ontic nearness of things that is belied by their ontological distance. It is where, for example, the nearness presented in mobile phone technology actually creates a distance: the oblivion involved in someone talking on a mobile phone to someone far away abolishes the nearness of those in close proximity. Thus, ‘the frantic abolition of all distances’, as Heidegger writes, ‘brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance’.21 Or as Michael Haar remarks, ‘the levelling of differences, notably between the near and the far, introduces a new tonality which is a new form of indifference or insensitivity’.22

In Being and Time this argument is anticipated in Heidegger's challenge to Kant's relegation of space and time to apriority and also in Heidegger's rethinking of practical action as being neither Euclidian nor perceptual in nature, as traditional epistemology had assumed.23 In either case, because metaphysics interprets being according to beings, the ontic nature of this interpretation sets up a spatial schema in which beings can be stored and analyzed. It is through this storing and setting, or enframing, that our understanding is directed in a decisive manner to see the world as a panorama of beings standing-forth at our disposal, where being itself is conflated into thinghood [res], designating things as independent entities as if they existed in a vacuum.24 In this reduction to thinghood, beings are extracted from being and made to stand forth unnaturally. The wholeness of their relation to other beings and the world is removed. To recall the example of the mobile phone: the removal of oneself from the immediate being-with-others is possible because the novelty of reaching someone at any moment (which is now an expectation of communication generally) legitimately stands before other notions of manners and social conduct. Where one is constantly speaking on a mobile phone in the course of one's daily involvement in the public realm, one is unnaturally standing forth as someone not actually ‘there’ but in a world enframed by mobile phone technology.

In view of the above, Heidegger states that metaphysics ‘represents’ being as beings, thereby grounding being itself in this representational ground.25 He refers to this kind of representing and grounding spatialization as a displacement in being where beings are no longer experienced as they are but as things determined at one's disposal. In this determination beings are set aside, as a standing by [Bestand] in which time and space are abstracted and have no real, ontological bearing. Heidegger therefore refers to this dislocation as ‘the standing-reserve’,26 a spatial determination that distorts time and in turn affects how we think time and being. Hence Heidegger states in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, ‘the question concerning the essence of time is the origin of all the questions of metaphysics and of their potential unfolding’.27 The understanding of time, in other words, determines the range and depth that reflection can assume in understanding metaphysical reality. The fullness of the understanding of time is therefore correlative to the fullness of what is possible as ontological meaning. It follows that if all things are extracted unnaturally from their ontological context, then this includes the content of metaphysical reflection. In this way, the understanding of time has itself become interpreted according to the spatialization of metaphysics, so the question of the meaning of temporality is obscured.28

The understanding of clock-time, for instance, is essentially a spatial relation to time in which temporality itself is conceived as a sequence of nows.29 The nows determine time in a specific way that reinforces the technological understanding of progress: time is repeated experimentation that secures mastery over nature or some operation within nature. It is essentially a spatial interpretation in which time itself is subordinated to the desire to gain control. That is to say, the repetition necessary to experimentation is a manner of flattening down time so that it can be repeated which, in turn, makes time conform to a series of tests that can assure us of certain results or a method to attain such results. And results are precisely those value-determinations by which one then begins to interpret being itself as ontically present before oneself. Such determinations stand before, and then subsequently as, the presencing of being.30 Houses, for example, and according to the science of land speculation, are no longer really dwellings but values on the marketplace, that is, locations that are not only desirable to live in but more importantly locations whose re-sale value is optimistic. The home is no longer a home. It is held over to be sold to others, a disposable and transferable unit of investment. Humans inevitably are no longer dwellers but consumers, investors, and of course, those who cannot buy land at all, renters and the homeless. Space, in this radical example, is portioned out according to a specific value determination in which a few have access to land and dwelling while others do not. Effectively – that is, phenomenologically – the very givenness of land upon which human being manifests (or is) is held captive by the values determined by the land market.

Let us relate this spatialization to Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Because being is spatialized and reality is interpreted in terms of individual entities, the question of being itself never comes to the fore in this instance of knowing. Metaphysics, as long as it thinks in this way, cannot, as Heidegger states, ‘ “get a hold on” this destiny yet, and that means thoughtfully to reach and gather together what in the fullest sense of Being now is’.31 Metaphysics is therefore a homelessness that has forgotten beings in relation to being itself. As long as metaphysics remains accepting or unaware of this homelessness, it is ‘the oblivion of Being’. Precisely because it conceals a fundamental ontology, it is a concealing meditation on the nature of the givenness of being itself [es gibt]: ‘Metaphysics is the oblivion of Being that means the history of the concealment and withdrawal of that which gives Being’.32

It is clear from the preceding analysis that Heidegger sees the history of philosophy as the historical culmination of the forgetting of being itself. However, in the next section I argue this unilateral critique is productively reopened by historicity. Or, as Ricoeur states, ‘Modernity is neither a fact nor our destiny. It is henceforth an open question’.33


In my effort to clarify Heidegger's critique, one should bear in mind that this interpretation does not replace the critique. Rather, it follows from it since to replace it would mean to forget the essential concealment in the history of philosophy that Heidegger wishes to bring to our attention. This is supported by Heidegger when he offers what seem to be contradicting or equivocal qualifications on what is involved in overcoming metaphysics. For example, Heidegger refers to the concealing nature of metaphysics as that which presents the opportunity to think. ‘This concealment is not a defect of metaphysics’, he writes, ‘but a treasure withheld from it yet held before it, the treasure of its own proper wealth’.34 He says elsewhere:

the withdrawal which characterized metaphysics in the form of the oblivion of Being now shows itself as the dimension of concealment itself. But now this concealment does not conceal itself. Rather, the attention of thinking is concerned with it.35

In view of this, Heidegger's understanding of metaphysics cannot be understood as a unilateral rejection. As Dominique Janicaud observes, the notion that one can leave behind metaphysics is deceived in thinking ‘as though it were possible once and for all to turn the page on foundational thought and to make a tabula rasa of the past’.36 In this sense, the concealment of metaphysics is the possibility of its unconcealment through the manner of thinking that takes express concern with it. Metaphysics undergoes, to use Ricoeur's phrase, a ‘peripeteia of logos37 where deconstruction designates ‘the negative side of a difficult process of anamnesis, as the rupture from the forgetfulness of Being’.38 Indeed, Heidegger embarks on this reversal by taking the prime question of metaphysics, ‘why something instead of nothing?’, showing how it calls for its own self-destruction (via nihilism) that in turn opens up a clearing for thinking. This recovery is an instance of Heidegger's notion of the ‘leap back’ to the origin which can only occur through a transformation of thinking.39 Metaphysics is therefore constituted by a limit which opens beyond itself … to itself. Samuel IJsseling observes in this respect that the critique of metaphysics is a stepping back into its essential reflection: ‘The “step back” moves out of metaphysics into the essence of metaphysics’.40 Or as Heidegger writes the ‘step back is understood as an “away from” and a ‘‘toward’’ ’. 41 In short, metaphysics turns from beings alone to the question of being itself, or ‘The Origin’ that is ‘Being [Seyn] itself’, to quote Heidegger.42

This interpretation of metaphysics is, I believe, what constitutes the inception of the turn as appropriation. And so far from refuting metaphysics, it would appear Heidegger is seeking a revivification of it in a new way. Janicaud notes, ‘[t]he principal mis-interpretation [of the overcoming of metaphysics] consists in presupposing that in Heidegger there is an [sic] “way out” of the metaphysical, or else in locating the turn “beyond it’’ ’.43 Heidegger's intention is not to escape metaphysics by overcoming it, nor is his project to annihilate it. On the contrary, Heidegger seeks a way in which the thinker can engage with this transformation of truth in the history of being and then think its concealment productively, that is, through an ontological reinvigoration of the tradition.

But what then is this kind of engagement with metaphysics? It is here that the magnitude of Heidegger's critique is set against the equivocal openness of what lies ahead in the recovery of the tradition. I suggest that this openness does not exist as a clearing upon which a method should be constructed. Rather, it should remain as that space by which the original, reflective provocation of being can emerge. Because this emergence is never purely primordial but occurs in relation, it is an openness with a unique historical expectation addressed to current historical necessities or crises. It is this tension between the original question of being and the historical necessities of an age that constitutes the heart and possibility of appropriation. In this way, the historical location of a thinker in the past is never lost completely but opened and made accessible by the current historical demands. Reinterpretation is not a regress from an original but a renewal of meaning according to new questions. This phenomenon is evinced in Heidegger's own unique readings of the early Greeks, Aristotle, Kant, Nietzsche, and, of course, more dubiously, what he saw as the possibilities of the National Socialist party.44 In any case, the hermeneutic participation is a return that must pass through the deconstruction of the current misunderstandings that have seemingly been inherited by us as we stand at the present point of reflection that looks forwards, backwards, and inwards. ‘In other words’, as Ricoeur writes,

if hermeneutics is always an attempt to overcome a distance, it has to use distanciation as both the obstacle and the instrument in order to reenact the initial event of discourse in a new event of discourse that will claim to be both faithful and creative.45

In this sense, distanciation as an ‘obstacle’ is embodied in the attitude to treat the tradition as passé, obsolete, or dead. Conceived as an ‘instrument’, the tradition is not the oppressive metanarrative to be overcome but the foundation by which new avenues of thinking are possible. The traditional discourse, however, cannot be reconstituted unless one passes through its sedimentation that has given rise to inappropriate interpretations. Hence, what is inappropriate hermeneutically stands to be re-appropriated. Sedimentation is not a sign of failure but instantiates the very nature of history as a passing away that provokes further renewal in human reflection. Ricoeur refers to this as the tension between the ‘singular essence’ of a philosopher's thought and the ‘system’ of the history of philosophy that we construct in order to contain a historical understanding. The play of the two constitutes what he in turn refers to as the proper mode of philosophical discourse that should never opt for one over the other.46 Similarly, one can refer to deconstruction as not only necessary within philosophy but inevitable for thinking that consciously participates in a historical understanding. Deconstruction therefore stands in view of a reconstruction of the tradition. This point seems simple enough. But if it is true, then even Heidegger's reading of the history of philosophy should be assimilated into, or at least should be seen as pointing towards, a more originary understanding of metaphysics itself.

In view of the above argument, the event of appropriation centers on what I shall refer to as the temporal key. If time is the essence of metaphysics, as Heidegger said earlier, then a reconfiguration of the understanding of time in relation to philosophical interpretation suggests that it can retrieve metaphysics. This last point seems to run directly against Heidegger and his well-known attacks on Plato, Aristotle, and theology generally. In the next section I shall propose in what manner the history of philosophy is not forgotten but retrieved.


In my attempt to argue for a retrieval of metaphysics via Heidegger, we must bear in mind his central objection: metaphysics thinks beings and not the being of beings. My task in this respect is to see how this objection is not unilateral but hermeneutical, that is, where it is addressed to a specific historical necessity that Heidegger places within the epochal destining of history itself. Thus, one must distinguish Heidegger's historical deconstruction from his ontology.47 The historical deconstruction is but one way, specific to the crises in this historical epoch, of entering into his project of ontology; and therefore, Heidegger should not be reducible to the history he deconstructs, even though some of his commentators assume he is.48 In this section, I shall attempt to demonstrate how the retrieval characteristic of historicity demands this manner of reinterpretation from us. There are many ways in which this demand can be taken up, but I shall confine myself to how the propositional statements of metaphysics can be broadened beyond the notion that they are merely representational.

My thesis in this regard states that the propositional statements of metaphysics, in stating and uncovering the nature of beings and reality, must be interpreted temporally, that is, always placed in relation to current historical demands, or what has been ‘fated’ [schicksal] in the history of philosophy.49 It is not the case, as Rorty holds, that such statements only contain those things which we, as humans, put into them as a kind of artificial representation with no ontological meaning.50 Rather, to regard such statements temporally means that the ‘said-as-such’ of its speaking is a continuously open-ended attestation. Its meaning is a range of possibilities whose limit is no less defined than the unpredictability of historical interpretation itself. But this does not reduce understanding to historical relativism, nor does it legitimize anything proclaiming to be metaphysical. Because metaphysical propositions concern an understanding of reality as such, one's subsequent engagement and interpretation of them is responsible to being itself – indeed the very ‘criterion’ to which Heidegger critiques the tradition. Or to phrase this another way: the propositional quality of metaphysical statements is possible because of being itself, that is, being as ground [Grund] that provokes the desire to know. Hence, ‘the arrow of meaning’ that a propositional statement attempts to follow is responsible to the ‘already-there’ of being which ‘belongs to its essential make-up’ and is its provocation.51 Ricoeur thus observes, ‘being is that act which, preceding and founding all possibility of questioning, grounds mutuality of the most singular philosophical intentions’.52 Heidegger remarks in a similar fashion, ‘What is most thought-provoking, then, could be something lofty, perhaps even the highest thing there is for man’.53 Propositions therefore contain an inherent tension between their origin (being) and how they let being lie before oneself (logos), or what is the correspondence between being and truth.54 The subjective nature of philosophical discourse that Rorty exploits is not anchored and reducible to the plurality of selves; but to the contrary, if one understands subject according to its ancient Greek meaning – that is, hypokeimenon as ‘that which is at the basis’ and ‘lies present as the ground for statements about something’– ,55 then philosophical discourse is always accessible and not deceived because the meaning of being is the horizon that calls forth questioning. It is by this measure, or accountability to being itself, that propositional statements stand in suspension to be understood again and again. This is true to the extent that even in the translation of traditional texts, the English rendering of the Greek in Plato, for example, embodies a definite metaphysical disposition addressed to specific metaphysical problems.56 One need only compare Natorp's Neo-Kantian reading of Plato to that of the early Heidegger who attempted to equate the Ideas with being-in-the-world.57

The temporal key thus suggests that a proposition is an emergent disclosure of the meaning of being according to the historical necessities of the interpreter. In this sense, in the act of interpreting propositions, one bears witness to and affronts the systematic fixation of understanding in the history of philosophy. This moment [augenblick] marks the hermeneutical situation that affords an interpretation as an act of ‘making present’;58 the noema of the thought of a past thinker is reinterpreted for the sake of the present: ‘Authentic history is an attending present’, as Heidegger says.59 One can say that the ontological nature of propositional statements uttered in the history of philosophy is to open beyond their systematization to what is possible for being itself in the present.60 However, as I have made clear earlier, the caveat is that propositions can only disclose this ontological vitality through an engagement with the historical past whose distance appears to undercut them. In this sense, and contrary to the simple notion of progress, our historical naiveté is astonished and infused with the otherness of a historical past that it must come to appropriate, deliberately and critically but also creatively.

Or, let us approach the question of historicity in another way according to a paradox. The hermeneutical relationship involved in philosophy becomes much more recursive, or genealogical, when one attempts to see with what problematics past thinkers were engaging. Can we not see the historical predicament as a ‘philosophical motivation’ of ‘a totally moving Umwelt’ where a ‘philosophy is no longer the effect of a set of causes but rather that which encompasses everything else, and, up to a certain point, the choosing of its own historical motives’.61 This recursive feature is one which every philosopher assumes consciously or not since it is precisely a commitment to an interpretation of the history of philosophy upon which each philosopher stakes his or her relation to the tradition and the claim and hope for a continuing, philosophical dialogue. The recursive feature of philosophy attempts to mediate a historical antinomy: an interpretation of the ‘composite unity’ of historical events, on the one hand, that is outrun by the ‘dramatized narrative’ of historical time that moves ‘from episode to episode’, on the other hand.62 This antinomy refers to a dialectical playing in which an interpretative commitment sedimentizes a ‘composite unity’ of how history is in order that a future possibility can be articulated. This is important because history is never a dead, static past but is made concrete to a present understanding of what it is for a future possibility. This phenomenon is evinced by, for example, the changing attitudes towards the ‘primitive’ people of The Golden Bough to the original mythic cosmogenesis in which the sacred is no longer a fantastic, archaic superstition but a possibility of being-in-the-world that reenacts mythic meaning in illo tempore, to use Eliade's phrase. In philosophy, this commitment is observable in the understandings that accrue as philosophical movements. The attempt to resolve a preexisting predicament in order to move on attests to a process of transformation that can substantiate its concern only through its sedimentation as a school of or approach to thinking: from subjectivism to positivism, positivism to historicism, historicism to pragmatism, and so on. What is even more remarkable is that no movement is ever really dead insofar as a particular interpretation of the history of philosophy is still viable, even if in dialogical isolation. It is from this historical involvement that an ontological unfolding of the world which anticipates a future possibility is disclosed.

While a detailed analysis of such a hermeneutical relationship lies outside the remit of this article, I shall refer briefly to a key example that demonstrates how the sedimentation of past thinkers can be dissolved. In particular, with Plato, not only does the dialogical format of his works call for a subtler approach in relating arguments to what Socrates or Plato may be saying, as John Sallis notes;63 but one must also bear in mind that when Socrates puts forward the notion of the ‘Good beyond Being’ there is a tendency in the modern attitude to read this in terms of being embedded in a conceptual schema in which a transcendent reality supercedes the physical. This is the means by which Plato can make ‘certain’ and ‘rational’ his schema since all things are reducible to a single principle.64 What this reading ignores is that the ancient Greek understanding of the cosmos is one in which nothing exists outside it: the readings of transcendence and immanence are in this regard modern, post-Kantian ones. In addition, it is open to interpretation whether or not Plato was attempting to ‘prove’ the Ideas or illuminate one particular way in which the nature of reality could be seen as deeply as possible.65 In any case, a critical recognition of this dissolves a modern naiveté assuming that Plato was preoccupied with the same epistemological concerns as ours. This in turn suggests an alternative reading of the Good that refers to another mode of seeing [noein] in which something that exceeds the mere physicality of an appearance is apprehended. Even for Heidegger, his contention with Plato was not in positing a transcendent ‘elsewhither’, an interpretation possible only after a Christian influence that itself is but one interpretation of cosmogenesis. Rather, his critique was that in elevating something else over truth, that is, the Ideas, Plato transforms how truth is to be understood. Truth is subsequently rendered as correctness [orthos], or the correspondence between a thing in relation to the Idea that, according to Richard Rojcewicz, anticipates the basis of a modern subjectivity that sees its role as imposing itself upon things.66 Heidegger refers to Plato's notion of the Idea as that which takes precedence over the unhiddenness of truth [aletheia]. Thus the presencing of being [ousia] becomes reliant upon something other than its own essential nature. Or, as Heidegger writes, ‘ “Unhiddenness” now means: the unhidden always as what is accessible thanks to the idea's ability to shine’.67 Consequently, Plato sets up the possibility for truth to be determined, or destined, along the lines of the correctness of perception: ‘Through this correctness, seeing or knowing becomes something correct so that in the end it looks directly at the highest idea’.68

Nevertheless, the relegation of truth beyond being is not something explicitly posited by Plato though his thought did in fact contain the inception of such a reading. For Heidegger's argument to be consistent, one must ask what thinker's thought does not conceal some ‘destined’ misreading? The object of a historical recursion should not find cause of potential misreadings, a disposition that leads towards a sort of victimization in reading the history of philosophy, but to see how such misreadings are possible and can be clarified. By example, what we should note about Heidegger's interpretation of Plato is not his critique of the Ideas, but rather the concern that Heidegger is placing before the works of Plato themselves. To be sure, the young Heidegger saw in Plato a similar ontological formulation close to his own of being-in-the-world. Adriaan Peperzak notes:

Heidegger's meditation on ‘the good’ is focused on the meaning of the ‘beyond’ as the pre-ontic horizon of all ontic and ontological projections. This brings him to the attempt of identifying ‘the good’ of Plato with ‘the world’ as explained in Sein und Zeit. Dasein's transcendence to world, made possible by original temporality, is equated with the orientation of the psyche toward the good as its telos.69

While Heidegger's well-known argument is that Plato's thinking is ontotheological, this critique is itself bound up in Heidegger's larger project to destruct the modern metaphysical disposition that reads Plato in this ontotheological way, as he states in his lectures on Parmenides.70 Hence, Heidegger's earlier lecture on ‘Plato's Doctrine of Truth’ is transitionary, if not hermeneutically critical in order to arrive at a place for a new interpretive beginning for understanding Plato.71 Heidegger in fact recognizes that in the modern interpretation of Plato there is an unavoidable difficulty by which one assumes Plato's Ideas are concepts rather than the very essence which is presupposed by all things and therefore allows for the being of all things.72 In any event, regardless of which ‘Heidegger’ one chooses in relation to Plato, Heidegger's destruction opens up an alternative reading that is precisely the possibility of a reconstruction of Platonism. Peperzak hints at such a reading when commenting,

‘Idea’ is the name for that in being which, though not visible, audible or touchable, is more genuine than that which appears to those immediate acquaintances, insofar as they are not purified by thinking (noein). The idea is ‘the truth’ of such a being.73

Such a consideration offers a completely ‘new’ look at Plato, one that may in fact be ‘anti-Platonic’ according to how Plato is generally understood. In this respect, Heidegger's own deliberations over the meaning of the Good, from transcendental horizon to ontotheological determination, bear not an objective disclosure of the history of metaphysics but the historical situation that he was attempting to reveal. The moment of interpretation and encounter with past thinkers opens up to another exigency that Peperzak characterizes as the liberation of ‘Greek and un-Greek thoughts’ that are ‘willing to welcome us into dialogue’.74 History is retrieved not once and for all, but is, to the contrary, an ongoing reengagement prompted by contemporary problems. In this way, the very ‘bankruptcy’ of Platonism marks the difference according to which it should be thought again.

This hermeneutical attitude towards Classical sources suggests that the responsibility of being in the history of philosophy is one where the question of being is brought back to each epoch and each past thinker according to the present philosophical situation. To relegate a past thinker to a system in which he or she occupies an obsolete role is to treat the history of philosophy ontically, that is, by the very ontic determination that Heidegger challenges. In this reduction, past thinkers are merely beings attached to a system of thinking already determined and therefore at our historiographical disposal. The hermeneutical alternative is what Janicaud refers to as ‘bringing temporality face to face with the transcendental analytic’; it is to read past thinkers ‘no longer with respect to beingness, but to Being, which is taken up as a question’.75 The stagnation of tradition hinges upon how the propositional aspect of language is renewed as an open question that can be re-posed and rethought. Heidegger therefore writes, ‘Plato's thinking is no more perfect than Parmenides'. Hegel's philosophy is no more perfect than Kant's. Each epoch of philosophy has its own necessity’.76 Prior to the fixation of the word and the argument [logos], the hermeneutical onus for the reinterpretation of sources remains as the living foundation by which history assures itself of its constant renewal. That is to say, history's keeping safe lies in its inconstancy, in its passing away. Françoise Dastur makes light of Heidegger's notion of finitude in this same manner:

Since the very finitude of time precludes the possibility of its being projected upon something else, it is able to provide the ultimate light for the knowledge of beings and for the comprehension of Being.77

According to the temporal key, then, the path of propositional language in metaphysics should be seen as a structure building on its way that precipitates meaning according to unique historical ages that are defined by unique philosophical necessities. Moreover, it is the nature of philosophy that it must always be engaged historically, for the intercommunication of one philosophical age (and its necessities) with another ensures not a mundane repetition of the same but a meaning that is always emergent.

Finally, I shall add one last note in relation to metaphysics as the science of beings. Heidegger concludes his lecture ‘On Time and Being’ in 1969 as follows:

To think Being without beings means: to think Being without regard to metaphysics. Yet a regard for metaphysics still prevails in the intention to overcome metaphysics. Therefore, our task is to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself.78

If my argument is at all adequate, then the ‘leaving of metaphysics to itself ’ is not, as Rorty suggests, a complete despair with the task of recovery.79 As Caputo observes, part of Rorty's sense of despair originates from the reduction of language to practical, internal relations incapable of revealing the matter [Sache] of being itself – i.e., as ontic propositions.80 Heidegger comments later: ‘ “To think Being without beings” this does not mean that relation to beings is inessential to being, that we should disregard this relation’.81 I interpret this as saying not to leave beings altogether but to readdress our understanding of truth temporally, or, in Heidegger's words, to the Being [Seyn] that gives time.82 Thus, leaving metaphysics to itself is an act of appropriation that lets metaphysics be according to its manner of being, which is a historical openness constituted, at least for philosophy, as a reinterpretation motivated by its retrieval.83 It understands, in Heidegger's words, ‘history as ‘recurrence’ of what is possible and knows that a possibility recurs only when existence is open for it’.84 In retrieval one might say that ‘the forgetfulness of being’ is something we are always reminded of in our attempt to think beyond it. This double event of remembering the forgetfulness of being (destruction) according to its retrieval (reconstruction) is therefore constituted by the presencing of being itself through the detour of the history of philosophy as metaphysics, in which we arrive ‘too late’ to renounce. That is to say, overcoming is outrun by appropriation.

The preceding reformulation of Heidegger's critique, and my situating it within the reconstructive phase of his hermeneutics, posits a philosophical hope that is presupposed by Dasein's care in its reconfiguration via the temporal horizon. We might therefore hear Heidegger in a new key when he says, ‘the question concerning the essence of time is the origin of all the questions of metaphysics and of their potential unfolding’.


  1. 1 Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 32. See also David Couzens Hoy, ‘Heidegger and the hermeneutic turn’ in Charles Guignon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 170–94.

  2. 2 For the former see, for example, Jacques Derrida, ‘Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology’ in John Sallis (ed.), Reading Heidegger: Commemorations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 214–15; Jean-François Lyotard, ‘Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?’ in Thomas Docherty (ed.), Postmodernism: A Reader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 38–46; or Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 371–81. For the latter see, for example, Gadamer, The Hermeneutic Tradition (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990) and Ricoeur, A Ricoeur Reader: Imagination and Reflection (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

  3. 3 Cf. Hoy, ‘History, Historicity, and Historiography in Being and Time’ in Michael Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 348–9.

  4. 4 For example, see John Caputo, ‘The Thought of Being and the Conversation of Mankind: The Case of Heidegger and Rorty’ in Robert Hollinger (ed.), Hermeneutics and Praxis (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), pp. 248–71.

  5. 5 Caputo, Ibid., pp. 261–2. For similar treatments see: Dominique Janicaud, ‘Overcoming Metaphysics?’, Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought, trans. Michael Gendre (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), pp. 1–13; Michael Haar, ‘Attunement and Thinking’ in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (eds.), Heidegger: A Critical Reader (London: Blackwell, 1992), p. 171; Hoy, ‘History, Historicity, and Historiography in Being and Time’, Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, pp. 330–1; Robert Bernasconi, ‘Justice and the Twilight Zone of Morality’, Reading Heidegger, p. 85; Jeffrey W. Robbins, ‘The Problem of Ontotheology: Complicating the Divide between Philosophy and Theology’, The Heythrop Journal, 43:2 (2002), p. 143; Anthony Godzieba, ‘Prolegomena to a Catholic Theology of God between Heidegger and Postmodernity’, The Heythrop Journal, 40:3 (1999), p. 323; and William Vaughn, ‘The Phenomenology of Time in Pauline Epistles’, Encounter, 56 (1995), p. 149. Iain Thomson provides an illuminating and precise disucssion of Heidegger's understanding of the ontotheological constitution of metaphysics and assesses how Heidegger seeks a ‘deconstructive recovery’ of Plato's notion of paideia. However, Thomson's analysis generally characterizes the history of metaphyiscs as being pervaded by the tragic mistake of ontotheology and leaves unaddressed what then is to be done with this history after identifying its ontotheological structure; see Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 7–43; 155. What this kind of interpretation misses is that in so identifying the history of metaphysics as such, it falls prey to a historigraphical reading of metaphysics that unilaterally places any remedy that would maintain a dialogue with historical sources outside and beyond the initial destructive retrieve. In this case, Thales and Anaximander, whom Thomson identifies as the root of the non-necessary ontotheological source of metaphysics (p. 41), become the historical cause despite the appeal to the ontological priority given to the method of deconstruction itself.

  6. 6 Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 19.

  7. 7 Heidegger, On Time and Being, pp. 6–7. Mark Okrent, ‘The Truth of Being and the History of Philosophy’, Heidegger: A Critical Reader, pp. 145 & 150.

  8. 8 ‘The Turning’, The Question Concerning Technology, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 41; Otto Pöggeler, ‘Hermeneutics in the Technological World’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1:1 (1993), p. 39; Jean Greisch, ‘The Eschatology of Being and the God of Time in Heidegger’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 4:1 (1996), pp. 1742; and Okrent, Ibid., pp. 143–58.

  9. 9 Cf. Franco Volpi, ‘Being and Time: A “Translation” of the Nichomachean Ethics?’ in Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (eds.), Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 211. I explain this in more detail in ‘Commitment and Communication: The Aesthetics of Receptivity and Historicity’, Contemporary Aesthetics, 4 (2006); accessed May 27, 2006, available at http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=407.

  10. 10 Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), p. 153. All page references to Being and Time refer to the original pagination in the 7th German edition.

  11. 11 ‘Repetition and Tradition: Heidegger's Destructuring of the Distinction Between Essence and Existence in Basic Problems of Phenomenology’, Reading Heidegger from the Start, p. 124.

  12. 12 Heidegger, ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 154. Italics in original.

  13. 13 For support of my position see: Janicaud ‘Overcoming Metaphysics?’Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought, p. 11; Ricoeur, ‘Heidegger and the Question of the Subject’ in Don Ihde (ed.), The Conflict of Interpretations (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 224; Gadamer, ‘Martin Heidegger's One Path’, Reading Heidegger from the Start, pp. 25–7; Frederick A. Olafson, ‘The unity of Heidegger's thought’, The Cambridge Companion, pp. 97–121; and Frede ‘The question of being: Heidegger's project’, The Cambridge Companion, pp. 42–69.

  14. 14 Janicaud, Ibid., p. 11.

  15. 15 Ted Sadler, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being (London: Athlone, 1996), p. 1; Janicaud, ‘Overcoming Metaphysics?’Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought, p. 3.

  16. 16 Hubert Dreyfus, ‘Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 4:1 (1996), p. 3. Following Iain Thomson's more precise analysis, what I refer to here is the ontotheological side of metaphysics that seeks a supreme entity. This is but the other half of metaphysics that askes the ‘truth of the totality of entities as such’; see Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology, pp. 11–13. In either case, the general basis of metaphysics is that it seeks a singularity by which it can ground its thinking.

  17. 17 Louis Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 271.

  18. 18 Cf. William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 4th edition (New York: Fordham, 2003), p. 271.

  19. 19 Franco Volpi, ‘Dasein as praxis: the Heideggerian assimilation and radicalization of the practical philosophy of Aristotle’ in Christopher Macann (ed.), Critical Heidegger (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 58; and Frede, ‘The question of being: Heidegger's project’, The Cambridge Companion, p. 50. For a more recent and detailed study of Heidegger and space, see Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).

  20. 20 Volpi, ‘Being and Time: A ‘Translation’ of the Nichomachean Ethics?’Reading Heidegger from the Start, p. 198.

  21. 21 Heidegger, ‘The Thing’, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 165.

  22. 22 Haar, ‘Attunement and Thinking’, Heidegger: A Critical Reader, p. 170.

  23. 23 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 104–13; 203–6. Cf. Harrison Hall, ‘Intentionality and world: Division I of Being and Time’, The Cambridge Companion, pp. 127–8; Hoy, ‘Heidegger and the hermeneutic turn’, The Cambridge Companion, p. 182; and Cristina Lafont, ‘Hermeneutics’ in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (eds.), A Companion to Heidegger (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 274–5.

  24. 24 Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, The Question Concerning Technology, pp. 134–5 and An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 62–3. See also Frede, ‘The question of being: Heidegger's project’, The Cambridge Companion, p. 67.

  25. 25 Heidegger, ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’ in David Farrell Krell (ed.), Basic Writings, Revised 2nd Edition (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 432. Cf. on the importance of ‘There-being’: Richardson, Ibid., pp. 266–7.

  26. 26 Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 17.

  27. 27 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 171. Italics in original. In Being and Time (p. 17) Heidegger comments, ‘The meaning of being of that being we call Da-sein proves to be temporality [Zeitlichkeit].’Italics in original.

  28. 28 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts, p. 98. Cf. Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 167–89.

  29. 29 Heidegger on ‘vulgar time’; Being and Time, pp. 422–6.

  30. 30 See Heidegger's discussion of ‘validity’ in Being and Time, pp. 155–6; and Dreyfus, ‘Heidegger on the connection between nihilism, art, technology, and politics’, The Cambridge Companion, p. 293.

  31. 31 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, Basic Writings, p. 244.

  32. 32 Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 41.

  33. 33 Paul Ricoeur, ‘Proclamation and Manifestation’, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, trans. David Pellauer (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), p. 63.

  34. 34 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, Basic Writings, p. 235.

  35. 35 Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 41.

  36. 36 ‘Heideggeriana’, Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought, p. 16.

  37. 37 Symbolism of Evil, trans. by Emerson Buchanan, (Boston: Beacon Hill Press, 1967), p. 162.

  38. 38 Janicaud, ‘Overcoming Metaphysics?’Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought, p. 4.

  39. 39 As, for example, in Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 5–6; The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 59–66; and On Time and Being, p. 30.

  40. 40 Samuel IJsseling, ‘The end of philosophy’, Critical Heidegger, p. 198.

  41. 41 Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 30.

  42. 42 Heidegger as quoted in Jean Greisch, ‘The Eschatology of Being and the God of Time in Heidegger’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 4:1 (1996), p. 28.

  43. 43 Janicaud, ‘Heideggeriana’, Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought, pp. 15–16.

  44. 44 Guignon, ‘History and Commitment in the Early Heidegger’, Heidegger: A Critical Reader, p. 131. For a more nuanced understanding of Heidegger's involvement in National Socialism, see Frank Elder, ‘Philosophy, Language, and Politics: Heidegger's Attempt to Steal the Language of the Revolution of 1933–34’, Social Research, 57:1 (1990), pp. 197238 and Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology, pp. 78–140.

  45. 45 Ricoeur, ‘Philosophy and Religious Language’, Figuring the Sacred, p. 38.

  46. 46 Ricoeur, ‘The History of Philosophy and the Unity of Truth’, History and Truth, pp. 46; 50–6.

  47. 47 Cf. Maria del Carmen Paredes, ‘Amicus Plato magis amica veritas: Reading Heidegger in Plato's Cave’ in Catalin Partenie and Tom Rockmore (eds.), Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), pp. 118–19.

  48. 48 Godzieba, ‘Prolegomena to a Catholic Theology of God between Heidegger and Postmodernity’, The Heythrop Jounral, 40:3 (1999), pp. 31939. See also John Milbank, ‘Only Theology Overcomes Metaphysics’, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 40–1.

  49. 49 I draw on the relation between Heidegger's Geschichte (history as happening and not historiography), Schicksal (fate) and Geschickt (what is sent as fate in history). See Hoy, ‘History, Historicity, and Historiography in Being and Time’, Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, pp. 340–1; Guigon, Ibid., p. 136.

  50. 50 Caputo, ‘The Thought of Being and the Conversation of Mankind: The Case of Heidegger and Rorty’, Hermeneutics and Praxis, p. 257.

  51. 51 Caputo, Ibid., p. 253.

  52. 52 Ricoeur, ‘The History of Philosophy and the Unity of Truth’, History and Truth, p. 54. Italics in original.

  53. 53 Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 31.

  54. 54 Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper, 1984), pp. 89–90. Cf. Volpi, ‘Being and Time: A ‘Translation’ of the Nichomachean Ethics?’, Reading Heidegger from the Start, pp. 198–9.

  55. 55 Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, p. 9.

  56. 56 Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘The relationship of philosophy to its past’ in Richard Rorty, J.B. Schneewind and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 33–4.

  57. 57 I shall refer to Heidegger's understanding in more detail shortly.

  58. 58 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 350.

  59. 59 Heidegger, ‘Principles of Thinking’, The Piety of Thinking, trans. James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 48.

  60. 60 See Stephan Käufer's analysis of Heidegger's critique of logic in this regard; ‘Logic’, A Companion to Heidegger, p. 149–51.

  61. 61 Ricoeur, ‘The History of Philosophy and the Unity of Truth’, History and Truth, p. 48.

  62. 62 Ricoeur, ‘Objectivity and Subjectivity in History', History and Truth, p. 39. Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 20.

  63. 63 Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues, 3rd Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 1–22.

  64. 64 Richard Rorty, ‘Overcoming the tradition: Heidegger and Dewey’, Review of Metaphysics, 30:2 (1976), p. 294.

  65. 65 See, for example, David Roochnik Of Art and Wisdom: Plato's Understanding of Technē (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1996), pp. 1–15 and Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 137–40.

  66. 66 The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), pp. 90–4.

  67. 67 Heidegger, ‘Plato's Doctrine of Truth’ in William McNeill (ed.), Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 173.

  68. 68 Heidegger, ‘Plato's Doctrine of Truth’, Pathmarks, p. 177.

  69. 69 Adriaan T. Peperzak, ‘Heidegger and Plato's Idea of the Good’, Reading Heidegger, p. 259. I have transliterated the ancient Greek words in all passages by Peperzak.

  70. 70 Parmenides, trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 91–104.

  71. 71 Peperzak, Ibid., p. 263. Cf. del Carmen Paredes, Ibid., pp. 118–19.

  72. 72 Heidegger, ‘Plato's Doctrine of Truth’, Pathmarks, p. 175; Parmenides, pp. 104 & 124–9.

  73. 73 Peperzak, Ibid., p. 272.

  74. 74 Peperzak, Ibid., p. 284.

  75. 75 Janicaud, ‘Overcoming Metaphysics?’Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought, p. 5.

  76. 76 Heidegger, ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, Basic Writings, p. 433.

  77. 77 Françoise Dastur, ‘The ekstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality’, Critical Heidegger, p. 164.

  78. 78 Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 24.

  79. 79 Rorty, ‘Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism’, Heidegger: A Critical Reader, p. 229, n. 20 and also in his ‘Overcoming the tradition: Heidegger and Dewey’, Review of Metaphysics, 30:2 (1976), pp. 299–300.

  80. 80 Caputo, ‘The Thought of Being and the Conversation of Mankind: The Case of Heidegger and Rorty’, Hermeneutics and Praxis, pp. 256–7.

  81. 81 Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 33.

  82. 82 Heidegger, Ibid., p. 19.

  83. 83 Cf. Guignon, ‘History and Commitment in the Early Heidegger’, Heidegger: A Critical Reader, pp. 136–9; and Okrent, ‘The Truth of Being and the History of Philosophy’, Heidegger: A Critical Reader, p. 156.

  84. 84 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 391–2. See also Hoy, ‘History, Historicity, and Historiography in Being and Time’, Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, p. 336.