René Girard is something of a Janus for philosophers and theologians interested in the question of sacrifice. On the one hand, few thinkers in any century have made such a compelling case for the importance and centrality of sacrifice within all human culture. On the other hand, Girard has steadfastly insisted that sacrifice be understood in exclusively anthropological terms thus foreclosing the metaphysical and theological questions that prima facie seem to attend any robust consideration of sacrifice. In this essay, I seek to move beyond this Girardian impasse by supplementing Girard's late-thought with a more robust metaphysics of sacrifice as found in the work of the novelist, literary critic, and theologian, Charles Williams (one of the Oxford ‘Inklings’ and a close companion of C.S. Lewis). To begin with, I first explain Girard's understanding of the mimetic mechanism and the sacrificial origins of human culture. I then consider a number of the criticisms with which he has been charged, especially the accusation of methodological reductionism. I explore the way that Girard's late work has responded to a number of these criticisms but argue that Girard's responses fail to diffuse the charges. By way of conclusion, I suggest that Girard's insights can be saved when supplemented with the kind of relational metaphysics found in Williams' most perfectly realized novel, Descent into Hell. Rather than dispensing with ontology in favour of praxis, Williams transforms the profoundly Girardian themes of mediated desire, the doppelganger, mimetic rivalry, ritual, and the function of sacrifice by placing them in the context of what he calls the metaphysics of ‘co-inherence.’ This allows Williams to provide a far more positive account of both mimesis and sacrifice (even in its substitutionary mode) than Girard, not just non-retaliation but the actual bearing of one another's deepest burdens in communion, prayer, and love.