This article would not have come into being without the intense intellectual exchange I enjoyed with many colleagues and visiting scholars at the Center for the History of Emotions at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, for which I am very grateful. I also thank the members of the Amsterdam Center for Cross-Disciplinary Emotion and Sensory Studies for discussing parts of this paper with me, and those who read it and gave me valuable comments: Juliane Brauer, Ute Frevert, Benno Gammerl, Bettina Hitzer, Uffa Jensen, Anja Laukötter, Kaspar Maase, Stephanie Olsen, Margrit Pernau, Jan Plamper, Joseph Prestel, Bill Reddy, Anne Schmidt, and Tine van Osselaer. I also thank Clara Polley and Friederike Schmidt for their excellent research assistance. Most especially, I thank Pascal Eitler, whose invitation to collaborate on an article on emotions and the body was the first step toward developing the ideas in this article (Pascal Eitler and Monique Scheer, “Emotionengeschichte als Körpergeschichte: Eine heuristische Perspektive auf religiöse Konversionen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,”Geschichte und Gesellschaft 35 , 282–313).
ARE EMOTIONS A KIND OF PRACTICE (AND IS THAT WHAT MAKES THEM HAVE A HISTORY)? A BOURDIEUIAN APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING EMOTION
Version of Record online: 1 MAY 2012
© 2012 Wesleyan University
History and Theory
Volume 51, Issue 2, pages 193–220, May 2012
How to Cite
SCHEER, M. (2012), ARE EMOTIONS A KIND OF PRACTICE (AND IS THAT WHAT MAKES THEM HAVE A HISTORY)? A BOURDIEUIAN APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING EMOTION. History and Theory, 51: 193–220. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2303.2012.00621.x
- Issue online: 1 MAY 2012
- Version of Record online: 1 MAY 2012
- history of emotions;
- emotional practices;
- practice theory;
- Pierre Bourdieu;
- history of the self
The term “emotional practices” is gaining currency in the historical study of emotions. This essay discusses the theoretical and methodological implications of this concept. A definition of emotion informed by practice theory promises to bridge persistent dichotomies with which historians of emotion grapple, such as body and mind, structure and agency, as well as expression and experience. Practice theory emphasizes the importance of habituation and social context and is thus consistent with, and could enrich, psychological models of situated, distributed, and embodied cognition and their approaches to the study of emotion.
It is suggested here that practices not only generate emotions, but that emotions themselves can be viewed as a practical engagement with the world. Conceiving of emotions as practices means understanding them as emerging from bodily dispositions conditioned by a social context, which always has cultural and historical specificity. Emotion-as-practice is bound up with and dependent on “emotional practices,” defined here as practices involving the self (as body and mind), language, material artifacts, the environment, and other people. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus, the essay emphasizes that the body is not a static, timeless, universal foundation that produces ahistorical emotional arousal, but is itself socially situated, adaptive, trained, plastic, and thus historical. Four kinds of emotional practices that make use of the capacities of a body trained by specific social settings and power relations are sketched out—mobilizing, naming, communicating, and regulating emotion—as are consequences for method in historical research.