The author’s affiliation is CIPPEC & Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina. E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org. I thank María Victoria Murillo, Andrew Schrank, the anonymous reviewers, and participants at the “Enforcement, Evasion and Informality” conference held at the Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan for their comments. Research support from UNDP and the University of California Labor and Employment Research Fund is gratefully acknowledged.
Globalization, Domestic Institutions, and Enforcement of Labor Law: Evidence from Latin America
Article first published online: 29 JAN 2012
© 2012 The Regents of the University of California
Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
Volume 51, Issue 1, pages 89–105, January 2012
How to Cite
RONCONI, L. (2012), Globalization, Domestic Institutions, and Enforcement of Labor Law: Evidence from Latin America. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 51: 89–105. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-232X.2011.00664.x
- Issue published online: 29 JAN 2012
- Article first published online: 29 JAN 2012
This paper provides new measures of government enforcement of labor regulations in eighteen Latin American countries between 1985 and 2009, and explores how it is affected by external and domestic factors. The results suggest that governments react to the competitive pressures produced by trade opening by turning a blind eye to noncompliance, but increase enforcement in response to higher FDI. Governments also react to the demands of their constituent base to keep their support and reinforce partisan affinities, and workers are more effective in more democratic systems.