The authors’ affiliations are, respectively, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. E-mail: douc@deakin.edu.au; Department of Accounting and Finance, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. E-mail: janto.haman@buseco.monash.edu.au; Department of Economics and Business, Hendrix College, Conway, Arkansas, USA. E-mail: stanley@hendrix.edu.
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Pay for Performance and Corporate Governance Reform
Article first published online: 21 JUN 2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-232X.2012.00695.x
© 2012 Regents of the University of California
Issue
Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
Volume 51, Issue 3, pages 670–703, July 2012
Additional Information
How to Cite
DOUCOULIAGOS, H., HAMAN, J. and STANLEY, T.D. (2012), Pay for Performance and Corporate Governance Reform. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 51: 670–703. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-232X.2012.00695.x
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The authors’ affiliations are, respectively, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. E-mail: douc@deakin.edu.au; Department of Accounting and Finance, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. E-mail: janto.haman@buseco.monash.edu.au; Department of Economics and Business, Hendrix College, Conway, Arkansas, USA. E-mail: stanley@hendrix.edu.
Publication History
- Issue published online: 21 JUN 2012
- Article first published online: 21 JUN 2012
- Abstract
- Article
- References
- Cited By
Directors’ pay and corporate governance continue to generate public outrage and calls for reform. Our meta-regression analysis of all comparable UK pay-for-performance estimates finds little, if any, meaningful association between directors’ pay and corporate performance. However, there is evidence of the effectiveness of past “comply-or-explain” rules, especially the Cadbury Report. Unfortunately, the effects of past reform efforts tend to erode over time. This study also explores differences between pay–performance estimates, finding that these are largely explained by how pay and performance are measured by a given study.