The self-limiting success of Iran sanctions



    1. Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and Adjunct Professor at the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University.
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    1. Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, where her research focuses on energy, economic reform and US Middle East policy.
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Economic sanctions have often been considered an important tool for disciplining adversaries and compelling them to offer important concessions. History, however, suggests otherwise. Economic penalties rarely cause states to abandon important national assets. After decades of struggling under punitive financial measures, Iran has persisted with its objectionable policies ranging from terrorism to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. All this suggests that ideological regimes that put a premium on their political priorities and which are seemingly insensitive to the mounting costs of their belligerence may not be suitable candidates for the type of cost-benefit analysis that sanctions diplomacy invites.