The self-limiting success of Iran sanctions
Version of Record online: 21 NOV 2011
© 2011 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2011 The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Volume 87, Issue 6, pages 1297–1312, November 2011
How to Cite
TAKEYH, R. and MALONEY, S. (2011), The self-limiting success of Iran sanctions. International Affairs, 87: 1297–1312. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01037.x
- Issue online: 21 NOV 2011
- Version of Record online: 21 NOV 2011
Economic sanctions have often been considered an important tool for disciplining adversaries and compelling them to offer important concessions. History, however, suggests otherwise. Economic penalties rarely cause states to abandon important national assets. After decades of struggling under punitive financial measures, Iran has persisted with its objectionable policies ranging from terrorism to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. All this suggests that ideological regimes that put a premium on their political priorities and which are seemingly insensitive to the mounting costs of their belligerence may not be suitable candidates for the type of cost-benefit analysis that sanctions diplomacy invites.