SCREENING ETHICS WHEN HONEST AGENTS CARE ABOUT FAIRNESS†
Article first published online: 23 JAN 2006
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00372.x
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How to Cite
Alger, I. and Renault, R. (2006), SCREENING ETHICS WHEN HONEST AGENTS CARE ABOUT FAIRNESS. International Economic Review, 47: 59–85. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00372.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 23 JAN 2006
- Article first published online: 23 JAN 2006
- Abstract
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A principal faces an agent with private information who is either honest or dishonest. Honesty involves revealing private information truthfully if the probability that the equilibrium allocation chosen by an agent who lies is small enough. Even the slightest intolerance for lying prevents full ethics screening whereby the agent is given proper incentives if dishonest and zero rent if honest. Still, some partial ethics screening may allow for taking advantage of the potential honesty of the agent, even if honesty is unlikely. If intolerance for lying is strong, the standard approach that assumes a fully opportunistic agent is robust.

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