We thank the editor, Charles Horioka, and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments on previous versions of this article. Pais acknowledges the financial support of the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (PTDC/ECO/65856/2006). Pintér acknowledges the financial support from the Ministry of Education of Spain (SEJ2007-67135/ECON), from the Juan de la Cierva Program, from the UAM, and the Community of Madrid (CCG07-UAM/HUM-1693). Veszteg acknowledges the financial support from the Ministry of Education of Spain (SEJ2006-10087/ECON). This article was completed during Veszteg’s stay at the Institute for Social and Economic Research (Osaka University, Japan). Please address correspondence to: Róbert F. Veszteg, Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, c/Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid), Spain. Phone: +(34) 916245784. E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org.
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*
Version of Record online: 29 AUG 2011
© (2011) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association
International Economic Review
Volume 52, Issue 3, pages 713–737, August 2011
How to Cite
Pais, J., Pintér, Á. and Veszteg, . R. F. (2011), COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY. International Economic Review, 52: 713–737. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00647.x
Manuscript received February 2008, revised July 2009.
- Issue online: 29 AUG 2011
- Version of Record online: 29 AUG 2011
Three well-known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings. We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale–Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.