COMPETITIVE SEARCH, EFFICIENCY, AND MULTIWORKER FIRMS

Authors

  • William B. Hawkins

    1. Yeshiva University, U.S.A.
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    • This article is a substantial revision of part of my dissertation written at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; I am grateful to my advisors, Daron Acemoglu and Iván Werning, for helpful and timely suggestions and encouragement. It was revised while I was at the University of Rochester. I thank the editor, Jan Eeckhout, and three anonymous referees for a very insightful set of comments and suggestions. I also thank (in alphabetical order) Mark Aguiar, Herman Bennett, Olivier Blanchard, Claire Bowern, Glenn Ellison, Veronica Guerrieri, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Marek Pycia, Casey Rothschild, Robert Shimer, and participants at many seminars for comments. Please address correspondence to: William B. Hawkins, Department of Economics, Yeshiva University, 215 Lexington Ave., Room 711, New York, NY 10016. Phone: 917 326-4880. E-mail: whawkins@yu.edu.


  • Manuscript received April 2011; revised January 2012.

Abstract

I study competitive search equilibrium in an environment where firms operate a decreasing-returns production technology and hire multiple workers simultaneously. Firms post wages, possibly several of them. The equilibrium can feature wage dispersion even though all firms and workers are ex ante identical. Unlike the benchmark where firms hire a single worker, hiring is constrained inefficient. Efficiency requires that firms commit to the number of hires, pay all applicants, or pay wages that depend on the number of applicants. Under wage-posting, the inefficiency is highest at intermediate levels of labor market tightness.

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