Author's note: A technical supplement to this article, which is available from the author's website (http://www-polisci.tamu.edu/faculty/tarar), contains the proofs of the results presented in this article as well as additional analysis of the formal model. My thanks to Matthew Baum, Vesna Danilovic, Hein Goemans, Brett Ashley Leeds, T. Clifton Morgan, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. I am responsible for any remaining shortcomings.
Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War
Version of Record online: 24 MAR 2006
International Studies Quarterly
Volume 50, Issue 1, pages 169–188, March 2006
How to Cite
TARAR, A. (2006), Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War. International Studies Quarterly, 50: 169–188. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00397.x
- Issue online: 24 MAR 2006
- Version of Record online: 24 MAR 2006
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