Author's note: I thank colleagues from Georgetown University, the Brookings Institution, Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Princeton University's Center for Globalization and Governance, and three anonymous reviewers for comments on this project. I also thank students from Georgetown and Mannheim University as well as Bethany Albertson, Rosa Alonso, Jeffrey Anderson, Francis Beer, Andrew Bennett, Carl Brenner, Mark Copelovitch, Thomas Callaghy, James Davis, Kelly Greenhill, G. John Ikenberry, Patrick Jackson, Sarah Knight, Richard Ned Lebow, Jeff Legro, Jon Monten, Rodger Payne, Jon Rosenwasser, Thomas Risse, Frank Schimmelfennig, Sidney Tarrow, Leslie Vinjamuri, Mark Warren, and Thomas Wright for their helpful comments on earlier iterations. Thanks to Raymond Hicks for valuable suggestions for data. Special thanks go to those who agreed to be interviewed. These include David Bryden, Sonny Callahan, Jamie Drummond, Stephanie Flanders, Dan Driscoll-Shaw, Alan Gill, Scott Hatch, Thomas M. Hart, Nicola Jenns, Mark Lagon, Adrian Lovett, Jamie McCormick, Larry Summers, Susan Thompson, as well as other officials and advocates who provided me with invaluable background information.
Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics
Article first published online: 29 JUN 2007
International Studies Quarterly
Volume 51, Issue 2, pages 247–275, June 2007
How to Cite
BUSBY, J. W. (2007), Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics. International Studies Quarterly, 51: 247–275. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00451.x
- Issue published online: 29 JUN 2007
- Article first published online: 29 JUN 2007
Do states and decision-makers ever act for moral reasons? And if they do, is it only when it is convenient or relatively costless for them to do so? A number of advocacy movements—on developing country debt relief, climate change, landmines, and other issues—emerged in the 1990s to ask decision-makers to make foreign policy decisions on that basis. The primary advocates were motivated not by their own material interests but broader notions of right and wrong. What contributes to the domestic acceptance of these moral commitments? Why do some advocacy efforts succeed where others fail? Through a case study of the Jubilee 2000 campaign for developing country debt relief, this article offers an account of persuasion based on strategic framing by advocates to get the attention of decision-makers. Such strategic but not narrowly self-interested activity allows weak actors to leverage existing value and/or ideational traditions to build broader political coalitions. This article, through case studies of debt relief in the United States and Japan, also links the emerging literature on strategic framing to the domestic institutional context and the ways veto players or “policy gatekeepers” evaluate trade-offs between costs and values.