Formerly entitled “War and Incomplete Information.” Because of space constraints, the proofs to all of the propositions in this article are provided in a technical supplement, which is available at the authors’ Web sites at http://www.duke.edu/~bl38 and http://www-polisci.tamu.edu/faculty/tarar, as well the ISQ repositories at http://www.isanet.org/data_archive/, and the Dataverse Network: http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/. For helpful comments, we thank Andy Kydd, Bob Powell, and Branislav Slantchev, and seminar participants at the University of Chicago, the University of Texas (Austin), Columbia University, Duke University, and UC-San Diego, and at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, the Midwest Political Science Association, and the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. We also thank the anonymous reviewers for extremely useful comments that helped us focus our arguments. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-0518185 and SES-0518945).
Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining?*
Article first published online: 7 AUG 2008
© 2008 International Studies Association
International Studies Quarterly
Volume 52, Issue 3, pages 533–553, September 2008
How to Cite
Leventoğlu, B. and Tarar, A. (2008), Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining?. International Studies Quarterly, 52: 533–553. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00514.x
- Issue published online: 7 AUG 2008
- Article first published online: 7 AUG 2008
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