Authors' note: Randall W. Stone is the corresponding author (email@example.com). We thank Robert Keohane, Andy Kydd, Robert Pahre, and Duncal Snidal for useful comments on an earlier version. The replication package can be found at http://polisci.ucsd.edu/slantchev and the ISQ Dataverse at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/isq. It includes Aptech Gauss programs for the simulations and the complete proofs.
Choosing How to Cooperate: A Repeated Public-Goods Model of International Relations
Version of Record online: 27 MAY 2008
© 2008 International Studies Association
International Studies Quarterly
Volume 52, Issue 2, pages 335–362, June 2008
How to Cite
Stone, R. W., Slantchev, B. L. and London, T. R. (2008), Choosing How to Cooperate: A Repeated Public-Goods Model of International Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 52: 335–362. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00504.x
- Issue online: 27 MAY 2008
- Version of Record online: 27 MAY 2008
International relations theory has borrowed important intuitions from Olson's static public-goods model (hegemonic stability) and the repeated prisoners’ dilemma (theories of international cooperation), and arguments often combine implications from both models. We develop a general, repeated public-goods model. We then allow the qualitative dimensions of cooperation to emerge endogenously: agreements can have broad or narrow membership and entail deep or shallow commitments; they can be multilateral or discriminatory; they can be ad hoc or institutionalized. We find that the relationship between the distribution of power and international cooperation is complex: a large leading state forms a narrow coalition of intensive contributors, and builds institutions, while a smaller leading state forms a broader coalition that makes shallow contributions, and is more inclined to multilateralism.