Author’s note: I thank Kyle Beardsley, Benjamin J. Cohen, Timothy Crawford, Alan Kuperman, Alisa Rod, Florence Sanchez, Harrison Wagner, and Barbara Walter for helpful comments and suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Principal-Agent Problems in Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazards, Adverse Selection, and the Commitment Dilemma
Article first published online: 2 DEC 2009
© 2009 International Studies Association
International Studies Quarterly
Volume 53, Issue 4, pages 871–884, December 2009
How to Cite
Rauchhaus, R. W. (2009), Principal-Agent Problems in Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazards, Adverse Selection, and the Commitment Dilemma. International Studies Quarterly, 53: 871–884. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00560.x
- Issue published online: 2 DEC 2009
- Article first published online: 2 DEC 2009
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