I thank Stathis Kalyvas, Elisabeth Wood, David Mayhew, Kenneth Scheve, Ana Arjona, Carolina de Miguel, Abbey Steele, Joan Villarroya, Alexander Downes, Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, Ryan Sheely, José Luis Ledesma and Mario Chacón for comments, suggestions, and/or conversation on the themes in this article. I also thank the ISQ anonymous referees, and the participants in the Security and Governance Section of the Ninth Spanish Congress of Sociology, as well as the Comparative Politics Workshop at Yale University, where a first version of this article was presented in 2007. I am responsible for any remaining errors.
Rivalry and Revenge: Violence against Civilians in Conventional Civil Wars1
Article first published online: 7 JUN 2010
© 2010 International Studies Association
International Studies Quarterly
Volume 54, Issue 2, pages 291–313, June 2010
How to Cite
Balcells, L. (2010), Rivalry and Revenge: Violence against Civilians in Conventional Civil Wars. International Studies Quarterly, 54: 291–313. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00588.x
- Issue published online: 7 JUN 2010
- Article first published online: 7 JUN 2010
Recent research on violence against civilians during wars has emphasized war-related factors (such as territorial control or the characteristics of armed groups) over political ones (such as ideological polarization or prewar political competition). Having distinguished between irregular and conventional civil wars and between direct and indirect violence, I theorize on the determinants of direct violence in conventional civil wars. I introduce a new data set of all 1,062 municipalities of Catalonia during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and I show that the degree of direct violence against civilians at the municipal level goes up where prewar electoral competition between rival political factions approaches parity. I also show that, following the first round of violence, war-related factors gain explanatory relevance. In particular, there is a clear endogenous trend whereby subsequent levels of violence are highly correlated with initial levels of violence. In short, the paper demonstrates that an understanding of the determinants of violence requires a theory combining the effect of political cleavages and wartime dynamics.