The author would like to thank Lee Morgenbesser, Jo-Anne Gilbert, and Vanessa Newby for their research assistance and acknowledge the financial support of Australian Research Council Discovery Grants DP0771521 and DP0986608.
Testing the Global Financial Transparency Regime†
Article first published online: 9 OCT 2011
© 2011 International Studies Association
International Studies Quarterly
Volume 55, Issue 4, pages 981–1001, December 2011
How to Cite
Sharman, J. C. (2011), Testing the Global Financial Transparency Regime. International Studies Quarterly, 55: 981–1001. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00693.x
- Issue published online: 7 NOV 2011
- Article first published online: 9 OCT 2011
How can we tell whether rules that apply in theory actually do so in practice? Realists argue that the gap between what formal rules proscribe and their effectiveness may be particularly wide at the international level. Furthermore, dominant states may impose costly standards on others that they themselves choose not to implement. To test these propositions, the article assesses the effectiveness of international soft law standards prohibiting anonymous participation in the global financial system by seeking to break these standards. The findings indicate that the prohibition on anonymous corporations is relatively ineffective and is flouted much more in G7 countries than in tax havens. The article contributes to and extends the work of realist scholars in international political economy, both in their skepticism of formal rules and focus on the effects of power. Evidence is drawn from the author’s solicitations and purchases of anonymous shell companies from 45 corporate service providers in 22 countries.