An IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IN PURE PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMIES WITH FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS: VOTING BY COMMITTEES IN NON-RECTANGULAR FEASIBLE SETS*

Authors


  • *First, I wish to thank Professor William Thomson for his detailed comments and helpful suggestions. I also wish to thank Professors Salvador Barbera, Marcus Berliant, Matthew Jackson and Lionel McKenzie for their useful comments. And I appreciate the useful and detailed comments of the anonymous referee.

Abstract

We consider the problem of choosing an alternative in a pure public goods economy with feasibility constraints when voters have “additively-separable and single-peaked”preferences.Our purpose is to identify tops-only voting procedures satisfying “nonmanipulability” and “voter sovereignty”. First, we show that such procedures are generalizations of the schemes of “voting by committees”1)introduced by Barbera, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) in the sense that these procedures are defined similarly for the generalized feasible set. Second, we establish that when no two goods can be simultaneously produced at their maximal feasible levels, the procedures are characterized by the existence of a very powerful voter.

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