An earlier version of this paper was circulated as KIER Working Paper No. 583, Kyoto University. We thank an anonymous referee for comments and the seminar participants at Osaka University, Otaru University of Commerce, Tokyo Institute of Technology, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, the University of Tokyo, Stanford University, the University of Paris I, the University of Venice and the University of Mannheim. Kajii acknowledges financial support by MEXT, Grant-in-Aid for 21st Century COE Program. Ui acknowledges financial support by MEXT, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research.
1468-5876/asset/JERE_centre.gif?v=1&s=d4a8a809dabfd7095b6eb571b3548235e5a6360e)
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION GAMES WITH MULTIPLE PRIORS†
Article first published online: 17 AUG 2005
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00327.x
Additional Information
How to Cite
KAJII, A. and UI, T. (2005), INCOMPLETE INFORMATION GAMES WITH MULTIPLE PRIORS. Japanese Economic Review, 56: 332–351. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00327.x
- †
Publication History
- Issue published online: 17 AUG 2005
- Article first published online: 17 AUG 2005
- Abstract
- References
- Cited By
Keywords:
- C72;
- D81;
- D82
We present a model of incomplete information games, where each player is endowed with a set of priors. Upon arrival of private information, it is assumed that each player “updates” his set of priors to a set of posterior beliefs, and then evaluates his actions by the most pessimistic posterior beliefs. So each player's preferences may exhibit aversion to ambiguity or uncertainty. We define a couple of equilibrium concepts, establish existence results for them, and demonstrate by examples how players’ views on uncertainty about the environment affect the strategic outcomes.