Research for this paper has been supported by the European Union under the 6th Framework programme (Contract No. CIT1-CT-2004-506392; project website: «http://www.eu-newgov.org»). Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the International Workshop on ‘Transformation of the Nation State: Taxation and Police’ at the International University Bremen in June 2005, at the Annual PSA conference in Reading, June 2006 and at EUSA in Montreal in May 2007. The authors would like to thank the participants and two anonymous JCMS referees for their useful comments. We are especially grateful to Michel Aujean, Malcolm Gammie, Philip Gillett and Servaas van Thiel for having facilitated our fieldwork and for the detailed comments. Our colleague Bruce Doern kindly sent us his helpful views on the first draft. Thirty-four semi-structured interviews were carried out between December 2004 and April 2007.
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Governance Areas in EU Direct Tax Policy†
Article first published online: 14 FEB 2008
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00778.x
© 2008 The Author(s)
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How to Cite
RADAELLI, C. M. and KRAEMER, U. S. (2008), Governance Areas in EU Direct Tax Policy. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 46: 315–336. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00778.x
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Publication History
- Issue published online: 14 FEB 2008
- Article first published online: 14 FEB 2008
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Abstract
Conventional scholarship on international taxation tends to address competition. It focuses on governments and does not integrate purposeful political strategy with the ideational dimension of policy change. In this article we examine co-operation, use a multi-actor perspective to explain the selection of modes of governance and bridge the gap between the strategic and ideational components of policy change. We show how a political strategy pursued by the Commission has led to the emergence of two functionally differentiated governance arenas, dealing with different definitions of tax problems and operating with modes of governance that suit the internal logic of individual arenas. We then examine the limitations of political strategy, by showing how a third governance arena dominated by the European Court of Justice has become increasingly important, with little control exercised by the Commission and the Member States.