The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area

Authors


  • We are thankful to the participants of various seminars held at the Dutch National Bank, the ECB, the EUIJ (Hitotsubashi University) and the Davis Institute (Hebraic University of Jerusalem) for their helpful remarks. All errors remain ours.

Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
CEPII, 9 rue Georges Pitard
75015 Paris, FRANCE
Tel +33 (1) 53 68 55 41
Fax +33 (1) 53 68 55 02
email agnes.benassy@cepii.fr

Abstract

We study the impact of rotating votes in the ECB Governing Council after EMU enlargement, based on national and euro-wide Taylor rules and on a convergence assumption. We find that the rotation system yields monetary policy decisions that are close both to full centralization and to a voting rule without rotations.

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