The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation's NCCR Trade Regulation. An earlier version of this article was presented at the University of Leuven, University of Basel and at the 12th Biennial Conference of the European Union Studies Association. We wish to thank Dirk de Bièvre, Andreas Dür, Susan Kaplan, Bart Kerremans, Min Gyo Koo, Gabriel Siles-Brügge, Sungwook Yoon and Alasdair Young for valuable comments.
European Union Meets South Korea: Bureaucratic Interests, Exporter Discrimination and the Negotiations of Trade Agreements†
Article first published online: 1 FEB 2012
© 2012 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
Volume 50, Issue 3, pages 492–507, May 2012
How to Cite
ELSIG, M. and DUPONT, C. (2012), European Union Meets South Korea: Bureaucratic Interests, Exporter Discrimination and the Negotiations of Trade Agreements. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 50: 492–507. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02243.x
- Issue published online: 5 APR 2012
- Article first published online: 1 FEB 2012
Who in the European Union drives the process of pursuing bilateral trade negotiations? In contrast to societal explanations, this article develops a novel argument as to how the European Commission manages the process and uses its position in strategic ways to pursue its interests. Rooted in principal–agent theory, the article discusses agent preferences and theorizes the conditions under which the agent sets specific focal points and interacts strategically with principals and third parties. The argument is discussed with case study evidence drawn from the first trade agreement concluded and ratified since the EU Commission announced its new strategy in 2006: the EU–South Korea trade agreement.