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Syndicated Loan Announcements and Borrower Value

Authors

  • Dominic Gasbarro,

  • Kim-Song Le,

  • Robert G. Schwebach,

  • J. Kenton Zumwalt


  • The authors thank Gary Monroe, William T. Moore (editor), and Joseph F. Sinkey Jr. (the reviewer) for helpful comments and guidance.

Abstract

Announcements of syndication loans increase borrowers' shareholder wealth if they are revolving credit agreements but not if they are term loans. Share price responses to revolving credit announcements are positive and significant, whereas the wealth effect for term loans is negative and significant. The results show that announcements from both the financial press and commercial information providers can affect borrower share price reaction. Overall, single syndication announcements appear to be more newsworthy than multiple announcements reported in the financial press, and we find evidence of information leakage, post-announcement drift, or both.

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