We thank an anonymous referee, Narjess Boubakri, Jean-Claude Cosset, Jean-Marie Gagnon, Jayant Kale (the editor), and Oumar Sy for constructive comments on an earlier draft of this article. We also appreciate generous financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Omrane Guedhami gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Center for International Business Education and Research at the University of South Carolina.
DO MULTIPLE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS PLAY A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ROLE? EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIA
Article first published online: 16 NOV 2009
© 2009 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association
Journal of Financial Research
Volume 32, Issue 4, pages 395–422, Winter 2009
How to Cite
Attig, N., El Ghoul, S. and Guedhami, O. (2009), DO MULTIPLE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS PLAY A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ROLE? EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIA. Journal of Financial Research, 32: 395–422. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6803.2009.01255.x
- Issue published online: 16 NOV 2009
- Article first published online: 16 NOV 2009
We examine the governance role of multiple large shareholder structures (MLSS) to determine their valuation effects in a sample of 1,252 publicly traded firms from nine East Asian economies. We find that the presence, number, and size of multiple large shareholders are associated with a significant valuation premium. Our results also show that the identity of MLSS influences corporate value and that the valuation effects of MLSS are more pronounced in firms with greater agency costs. Our results imply that MLSS play a valuable monitoring role in curbing the diversion of corporate resources.