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How Probabilities Reflect Evidence

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10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00058.x

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  1. 1Lieven Decock, Igor Douven, Marta Sznajder, A geometric principle of indifference, Journal of Applied Logic, 2016CrossRef
  2. 2Seamus Bradley, Katie Steele, Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist, Philosophy of Science, 2016, 83, 1, 1CrossRef
  3. 3Stefan Dragulinescu, Inference to the best explanation and mechanisms in medicine, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 2016, 37, 3, 211CrossRef
  4. 4Susanna Schellenberg, Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: replies to McGrath, Pautz, and Neta, Philosophical Studies, 2016, 173, 4, 929CrossRef
  5. 5Conor Mayo-Wilson, Gregory Wheeler, Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2016, n/aWiley Online Library
  6. 6Eric Swanson, The Application of Constraint Semantics to the Language of Subjective Uncertainty, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2016, 45, 2, 121CrossRef
  7. 7Jeff Kasser, Two Conceptions of Weight of Evidence in Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science, Erkenntnis, 2016, 81, 3, 629CrossRef
  8. 8Jennifer Carr, CHANCY ACCURACY AND IMPRECISE CREDENCE, Philosophical Perspectives, 2015, 29, 1, 67Wiley Online Library
  9. 9Sarah Moss, Credal Dilemmas, Noûs, 2015, 49, 4, 665Wiley Online Library
  10. 10Martin Smith, Evidential Incomparability and the Principle of Indifference, Erkenntnis, 2015, 80, 3, 605CrossRef
  11. 11Sinan Dogramaci, KNOWING OUR DEGREES OF BELIEF, Episteme, 2015, 1CrossRef
  12. 12Miriam Schoenfield, The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences, Noûs, 2015, n/aWiley Online Library
  13. 13Yann Benétreau-Dupin, The Bayesian who knew too much, Synthese, 2015, 192, 5, 1527CrossRef
  14. 14Aidan Lyon, Vague Credence, Synthese, 2015CrossRef
  15. 15Christine A Anderson, Marita G Titler, Development and verification of an agent-based model of opinion leadership, Implementation Science, 2014, 9, 1CrossRef
  16. 16Sean Walsh, Empiricism, probability, and knowledge of arithmetic: A preliminary defense, Journal of Applied Logic, 2014, 12, 3, 319CrossRef
  17. 17William Roche, Elliott Sober, Explanatoriness and Evidence: A Reply to McCain and Poston, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2014, 3, 3, 193Wiley Online Library
  18. 18Krista Lawlor, Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation, Inquiry, 2014, 57, 1, 1CrossRef
  19. 19Miriam Schoenfield, Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief , Noûs, 2014, 48, 2, 193Wiley Online Library
  20. 20Daniel Jeremy Singer, Sleeping beauty should be imprecise, Synthese, 2014, 191, 14, 3159CrossRef

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