Narrative Integration, Fragmented Selves, and Autonomy
Version of Record online: 18 DEC 2009
© by Hypatia, Inc.
Special Issue: FEAST I: Current Work in Feminist Ethics and Social Theory: Guest Editor: Diana Tietjens Meyers
Volume 25, Issue 1, pages 31–54, Winter 2010
How to Cite
MACKENZIE, C. and POLTERA, J. (2010), Narrative Integration, Fragmented Selves, and Autonomy. Hypatia, 25: 31–54. doi: 10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01083.x
- Issue online: 16 FEB 2010
- Version of Record online: 18 DEC 2009
In this paper we defend the notion of narrative identity against Galen Strawson's recent critique. With reference to Elyn Saks's memoir of her schizophrenia, we question the coherence of Strawson's conception of the Episodic self and show why the capacity for narrative integration is important for a flourishing life. We also argue that Saks's case and reflections on the therapeutic role of “illness narratives” put pressure on narrative theories that specify unduly restrictive constraints on self-constituting narratives, and clarify the need to distinguish identity from autonomy.