Two Kinds of Unknowing
Version of Record online: 4 MAR 2011
© by Hypatia, Inc.
Volume 26, Issue 2, pages 294–307, Spring 2011
How to Cite
MASON, R. (2011), Two Kinds of Unknowing. Hypatia, 26: 294–307. doi: 10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01175.x
- Issue online: 27 APR 2011
- Version of Record online: 4 MAR 2011
Miranda Fricker claims that a “gap” in collective hermeneutical resources with respect to the social experiences of marginalized groups prevents members of those groups from understanding their own experiences (Fricker 2007). I argue that because Fricker misdescribes dominant hermeneutical resources as collective, she fails to locate the ethically bad epistemic practices that maintain gaps in dominant hermeneutical resources even while alternative interpretations are in fact offered by non-dominant discourses. Fricker's analysis of hermeneutical injustice does not account for the possibility that marginalized groups can be silenced relative to dominant discourses without being prevented from understanding or expressing their own social experiences. I suggest that a gap in dominant hermeneutical resources is ambiguous between two kinds of unknowing: hermeneutical injustice suffered by members of marginalized groups, and epistemically and ethically blameworthy ignorance perpetrated by members of dominant groups.