The Social Construction of Human Kinds
Version of Record online: 16 SEP 2012
© by Hypatia, Inc.
Volume 28, Issue 4, pages 716–732, Fall 2013
How to Cite
Sveinsdóttir, Á. K. (2013), The Social Construction of Human Kinds. Hypatia, 28: 716–732. doi: 10.1111/j.1527-2001.2012.01317.x
- Issue online: 28 OCT 2013
- Version of Record online: 16 SEP 2012
- Manuscript Accepted: 26 APR 2012
- Manuscript Revised: 8 FEB 2012
- Manuscript Received: 18 FEB 2011
Social construction theorists face a certain challenge to the effect that they confuse the epistemic and the metaphysical: surely our conceptions of something are influenced by social practices, but that doesn't show that the nature of the thing in question is so influenced. In this paper I take up this challenge and offer a general framework to support the claim that a human kind is socially constructed, when this is understood as a metaphysical claim and as a part of a social constructionist debunking project. I give reasons for thinking that a conferralist framework is better equipped to capture the social constructionist intuition than rival accounts of social properties, such as a constitution account and a response-dependence account, and that this framework helps to diagnose what is at stake in the debate between the social constructionists and their opponents. The conferralist framework offered here should be welcomed by social constructionists looking for firm foundations for their claims, and for anyone else interested in the debate over the social construction of human kinds.