The authors thank two anonymous referees, a coeditor as well as René Fahr, Matthias Kräkel, Johannes Münster, and Dirk Sliwka for helpful comments. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) via SFB-TR 15 (Governance and the efficiency of economic systems) as well as research grant HA 4462/1-1 and HA 4462/1-2.
Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Experimental Evidence
Article first published online: 28 SEP 2010
© 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Volume 19, Issue 3, pages 771–810, Fall 2010
How to Cite
Gürtler, O. and Harbring, C. (2010), Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Experimental Evidence. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 19: 771–810. doi: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00269.x
- Issue published online: 28 SEP 2010
- Article first published online: 28 SEP 2010
We theoretically as well as experimentally analyze tournaments in which one of the agents leads over the other before entering the tournament, that is, in which one of the competitors benefits from a head start. The principal may decide upon informing the agents about the degree of this asymmetry. She cannot commit to giving feedback ex ante or not and, thus, chooses the strategy that is optimal for her ex post. In equilibrium, the principal reveals information if the asymmetry is not too large. Our experimental findings qualitatively confirm our theoretical prediction. Moreover, behavior of the principal and the agents is well aligned to each other.