We thank Mathias Dewatripont, Guido Friebel, Paul Heidhues, Ian Jewitt, Thomas Kittsteiner, Matthias Kräkel, Johan Lagerlöf, Meg Meyer, David Myatt, Urs Schweizer, John Sutton and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Nafziger is grateful to Nuffield College, University of Oxford for its kind hospitality.
Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited
Article first published online: 15 OCT 2012
© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Volume 21, Issue 4, pages 1029–1059, Winter 2012
How to Cite
Koch, A. K. and Nafziger, J. (2012), Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 21: 1029–1059. doi: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2012.00347.x
- Issue published online: 15 OCT 2012
- Article first published online: 15 OCT 2012
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