Group Identity and the Moral Hazard Problem: Experimental Evidence
Version of Record online: 15 OCT 2012
© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Volume 21, Issue 4, pages 1061–1081, Winter 2012
How to Cite
Dugar, S. and Shahriar, Q. (2012), Group Identity and the Moral Hazard Problem: Experimental Evidence. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 21: 1061–1081. doi: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2012.00350.x
- Issue online: 15 OCT 2012
- Version of Record online: 15 OCT 2012
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