In this case adding more outsiders is in theory beneficial because of Condorcet's jury theorem, which states that increasing the committee size improves group decisions that are based on imperfect information. Blinder and Morgan (2008) demonstrate in an experiment that doubling the committee size from four to eight indeed leads to better monetary policy outcomes.
Outsiders at the Bank of England's MPC
Version of Record online: 10 AUG 2009
© 2009 The Ohio State University
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
Volume 41, Issue 6, pages 1099–1115, September 2009
How to Cite
GERLACH-KRISTEN, P. (2009), Outsiders at the Bank of England's MPC. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41: 1099–1115. doi: 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2009.00248.x
The views expressed in this paper are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swiss National Bank. I thank the Editor, two anonymous referees, Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche, Severin Bernhard, Urs Birchler, Alan Blinder, Alex Cukierman, Petra Geraats, Stefan Gerlach, Charles Goodhart, Charlotta Groth, Heinz Herrmann, Lavan Mahadeva, Ellen Meade, Samuel Reynard, Barbara Rudolf, Christopher Spencer, Mathias Zurlinden, and seminar participants at the SNB, the Norges Bank Research Workshop on Monetary Policy Committees, and the 2008 Bundesbank-OeNB-SNB workshop for helpful comments.
- Issue online: 10 AUG 2009
- Version of Record online: 10 AUG 2009
- Received September 11, 2007; and accepted in revised form March 13, 2009.
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