Thanks to Scott Ashworth, John Duggan, Hein Goemans, Jim Johnson, Maria Montero, David Primo, and an anonymous referee for their feedback. I am responsible for any errors.
Proposal Rights and Political Power
Article first published online: 29 MAR 2006
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 50, Issue 2, pages 441–448, April 2006
How to Cite
Kalandrakis, T. (2006), Proposal Rights and Political Power. American Journal of Political Science, 50: 441–448. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00193.x
- Issue published online: 29 MAR 2006
- Article first published online: 29 MAR 2006
In a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players' voting rights or their impatience. For all monotonic voting rules and discount factors, and for all divisions of the good among players, there exists a stationary proposal-making rule such that this division represents players' expected payoffs in a Stationary Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The result highlights the significance of proposal rights in determining political power in collective deliberations.