Maria Victoria Murillo is associate professor of political science, Columbia University, 420 W. 118th Street #832, New York, NY 10027 (email@example.com). Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo is assistant professor of political science, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Carretera México-Toluca 3655, Lomas de Santa Fe 01210, México, D.F., México (firstname.lastname@example.org).
Political Competition and Policy Adoption: Market Reforms in Latin American Public Utilities
Article first published online: 4 JAN 2007
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 51, Issue 1, pages 120–139, January 2007
How to Cite
Murillo, M. V. and Martínez-Gallardo, C. (2007), Political Competition and Policy Adoption: Market Reforms in Latin American Public Utilities. American Journal of Political Science, 51: 120–139. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00241.x
We would like to thank the following people for their insightful comments and conversations: Ruth Collier, Keith Darden, Jorge Dominguez, Jeffrey Frieden, Anna Gryzmala-Busse, Evelyne Huber, John Huber, Pauline Jones-Luong, Ira Katznelson, Robert Kaufman, Evan Lieberman, Covadonga Messeguer, Layna Mosley, Pablo Pinto, Graeme Robertson, Carlos Rufin, Andrew Schrank, Mike Tomz, the participants in the Stanford University Comparative Politics Workshop, the University of Chicago Comparative Politics Workshop, the Watson Institute Colloquium on Comparative Research at Brown University, the GSP workshop, the David Rockefeller Seminar on Latin America at Harvard University, and the Conference on Regulation in Latin America: Internationalization and Domestic Politics at CIDE, and four anonymous reviewers. We would also like to thank for help with data and coding issues Dinorah Azpuru, Ana Maria Bejarano, Miguel Carter, Michael Coppedege, Ricardo Cordova, Diego Finchelstein, Jonathan Hartlyn, Witold Henisz, David Levi-Faur and Jacint Jordana, Lazlo Lovei, Orlando Perez, Emilio Pineda, David Roll, James Vreeland, and Lixin Colin Xu. M. Victoria Murillo acknowledges funding from CIBER and ISERP and the institutional support of the Departments of Political Science and International Affairs at Columbia University and Cecilia Martınez-Gallardo thanks the institutional support of CIDE.
- Issue published online: 4 JAN 2007
- Article first published online: 4 JAN 2007
This article shows that political competition generates incentives that affect the pace of adoption of market reforms in the context of policy convergence. Previous work shows the effect of financial and technological pressures in promoting policy convergence and the impact of institutional constraints on shaping the pace of policymaking. Controlling for these effects, this article demonstrates the policy effects of political competition and ideological polarization even at a time when ideological policy differences seem to be fading due to policy convergence. This article studies policy adoption using duration analysis for the 18 countries of Latin America during the 1985–2000 period when most of the market reforms in public utilities were adopted.