Thanks to Cliff Carrubba, Terry Chapman, Valeria Palanza, Eric Reinhardt, Dan Reiter, Toby Rider, Emily Ritter, Amy Yuen, participants at the 2006 Michigan EITM-V workshop, and four anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions.
The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict
Version of Record online: 2 OCT 2007
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 51, Issue 4, pages 772–788, October 2007
How to Cite
Wolford, S. (2007), The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict. American Journal of Political Science, 51: 772–788. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00280.x
- Issue online: 2 OCT 2007
- Version of Record online: 2 OCT 2007
A formal model of crisis bargaining in the shadow of leadership turnover is analyzed where (1) successive leaders of the same state may differ in their resolve, (2) their resolve is private information, and (3) the probability of leadership turnover depends on bargaining behavior and conflict outcomes. The model provides novel answers to a number of questions about the relationship between an incumbent's time in office, the prospects of losing office, the anticipated behavior of future leaders, and the current probability of conflict. Taken together, these results add further weight to recent claims that leaders, not states, should be considered the fundamental units of analysis in international relations.