An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2004 meeting of the American Political Science Association and the 2004 meeting of the Southern Political Science Association in New Orleans. This earlier version received the Leon Weaver Award for best paper presented on an Electoral Systems and Representation Panel at the APSA Annual Meeting in 2004. The author thanks Michelle Taylor-Robinson, David Richards, Octavio Amorim Neto, Royce Carroll, Marc Rosenblum, two anonymous reviewers, the members of the Faculty Brown Bag Seminar in the Department of Government at the College of William and Mary, and the participants in the Political Science Research Workshop at the University of South Carolina for helpful comments; Octavio Amorim Neto, Fabiano Santos, Argelina C. Figueiredo, and Fernando Limongi for kindly sharing their Brazilian roll-call data; and Barry Ames for kindly sharing municipal-level electoral data for legislative elections in 1986 and 1990. This research was supported by grants from the College of Liberal Arts at the University of South Carolina and by a Research and Productive Scholarship Grant from the University of South Carolina.
Proffering Pork: How Party Leaders Build Party Reputations in Brazil
Article first published online: 4 APR 2008
©2008, Midwest Political Science Association
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 52, Issue 2, pages 290–303, April 2008
How to Cite
Lyne, M. M. (2008), Proffering Pork: How Party Leaders Build Party Reputations in Brazil. American Journal of Political Science, 52: 290–303. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00313.x
- Issue published online: 4 APR 2008
- Article first published online: 4 APR 2008
Despite its highly candidate-centered electoral law, recent studies have shown that Brazilian party leaders are more powerful, and Brazilian parties are more unified, than alleged by long-dominant scholarship. Examining post-War and contemporary democracy in Brazil, governed by the same federal legislative electoral law, this article provides a controlled test of the role of leadership and electoral law in driving party unity. The combination of leadership intervention to enforce unity, increased unity, and partisan tides in contemporary Brazil, in contrast to an absence of leadership intervention, lower unity, and no partisan tides in the post-War, provides strong support for the role of the leadership in generating unity, as emphasized in the collective action theory of party organization. The findings also suggest that a general theory of variation in party unity requires examining factors that lead to variation in party leaders' incentives to enforce unity, in addition to the current emphasis on backbenchers' incentives to defy the leadership.