I am indebted to Dan Reiter, Cliff Carrubba, Jeff Staton, Eric Reinhardt, Kristian Gleditsch, David Lake, Branislav Slantchev, Barbara Walter, David Meyer, Holger Schmidt, participants of the PIPES workshop at the University of Chicago, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and discussion. I am especially appreciative of Nigel Lo's assistance in coding the data.
Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems
Article first published online: 29 SEP 2008
©2008, Midwest Political Science Association
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 52, Issue 4, pages 723–740, October 2008
How to Cite
Beardsley, K. (2008), Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems. American Journal of Political Science, 52: 723–740. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00339.x
- Issue published online: 29 SEP 2008
- Article first published online: 29 SEP 2008
Mediation has competing short- and long-term effects. In the short run, the actors are better able to identify and settle on a mutually satisfying outcome. In the long run, mediation can create artificial incentives that, as the mediator's influence wanes and the combatants' demands change, leave the actors with an agreement less durable than one that would have been achieved without mediation. This article tests the observable implications from this logic using a set of international crises from 1918 to 2001. The results reconcile findings in the previous literature that inconsistently portray the effectiveness of mediation.